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HOW TO IMPROVE RETAIL INVESTOR
PROTECTION AFTER THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT
Barbara Black*
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
gives the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to address two
issues especially important to retail investors. First, section 913 requires
the SEC to conduct a six-month study on the effectiveness of existing
standards of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers and
specifically authorizes the SEC to establish a fiduciary duty for brokerdealers. Second, section 921 grants the SEC authority to prohibit the use
of predispute arbitration agreements that would require investors to
arbitrate future disputes arising under the federal securities laws and
regulations or the rules of a self-regulatory organization. What has been
overlooked in the debate over retail investor protection is the
interconnectedness of these two provisions. Debate over retail investor
protection after Dodd-Frank must consider these two issues together in
order to achieve the goal of better retail investor protection. I make three
principal arguments. First, I argue that broker-dealers and investment
advisers should be held to standards of care and competence based on
professionalism, rather than fiduciary duty. Second, I propose, for
adoption by the SEC, federal professional standards of care and
competence for broker-dealers and investment advisers. Third, I argue
that the SEC’s adoption of standards of care and competence will not
create any additional federal remedies for investors because it is unlikely
that the United States Supreme Court will imply a private damages remedy
for their breach. If the SEC prohibits mandatory securities arbitration of
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claims based on federal securities law and SEC and SRO rules, the ability
of retail investors, particularly those with small claims, to recover damages
for careless and incompetent investment advice may be substantially
reduced.
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),1
comprehensive financial reform legislation enacted in response to the 20082009 financial crisis. Dodd-Frank gives the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) the authority to deal with two issues especially
important to retail investors.2
First, section 913 addresses what is generally described as
harmonizing the standard of conduct between broker-dealers and
investment advisers (collectively, investment advice providers) or holding
broker-dealers to the federal fiduciary duty standard applicable to
investment advisers. Today broker-dealers and investment advisers
compete head-on for the retail investors‘ business. Both solicit investors‘
business on the basis of the quality of their investment advice and advertise
that they provide ongoing advice tailored to meet their customers‘ changing
needs. Although retail investors may perceive the nature of their services
as identical, broker-dealers and investment advisers are subject to different
regulatory schemes and standards of conduct, which cause investor
confusion and concern about the adequacy of retail investor protection.3
Section 913 requires the SEC to conduct a six-month study and to report to
Congress on the effectiveness of existing standards of care for brokerdealers and investment advisers and on ―whether there are legal or
regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or overlaps in legal or regulatory standards
in the protection of retail customers relating to the standards of care.‖4 The
statute provides that the SEC may commence a rulemaking to address these
issues5 and specifically authorizes the SEC to establish a fiduciary duty for
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
2. Dodd-Frank defines a ―retail customer‖ as a ―natural person . . . who [] receives
personalized investment advice . . . from a broker or dealer or investment adviser; and []
uses such advice primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.‖ Id. § 913(a). In
general, retail investors have smaller portfolios, and their investment knowledge is less
extensive, than sophisticated investors such as institutional investors.
3. ANGELA HUNG ET AL., INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 117-18 (2008) [hereinafter THE RAND STUDY].
4. Dodd-Frank, § 913(b)(2); see also Dodd-Frank, § 913(c) (setting forth a number of
factors for the SEC to take into consideration when conducting its study).
5. Id. § 913(f).
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broker-dealers.6
Second, section 921 addresses the issue of mandatory securities
arbitration.
Currently, virtually all broker-dealers include in their
customers‘ agreements a predispute arbitration agreement (PDAA) that
requires customers to arbitrate their disputes before the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (FINRA) arbitration forum.7 Many investment
advisers also include PDAAs that require arbitration before a commercial
forum.8 Section 921 grants the SEC the authority to limit or prohibit the
use of PDAAs that would require customers9 of investment advice
providers to arbitrate future disputes arising under the federal securities
laws and regulations or the rules of a self-regulatory organization (SRO).10
Although each issue is controversial and has been the subject of
extensive debate, the close relationship between the two has been largely
overlooked. Investors who suffer losses caused by poor investment advice
will seek to recover damages from their investment advice providers under
any standard of care adopted by the SEC. If the SEC bans PDAAs for
claims based on federal securities laws and SEC and SRO rules, many
parties will likely litigate these claims in court, contrary to current practice.
Migration of these claims away from the FINRA arbitration forum could,
in turn, significantly impact the securities arbitration process in ways that
may be disadvantageous to retail investors. Accordingly, debate over retail
investor protection after Dodd-Frank must consider these two issues
together in order to achieve the goal of better retail investor protection.
This article seeks to shed some light on, and remove some heat from,
these often contentious debates. After providing background in Part II, I
make three arguments:
6. Id. § 913(g). There are significant limitations on the scope of the fiduciary duty the
SEC is authorized to adopt, as discussed infra notes 76-78, 185 and accompanying text.
7. See Arbitration & Mediation, FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. (FINRA),
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (―FINRA
operates the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry . . . .‖).
8. See, e.g., Bakas v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn.
2009) (enforcing arbitration clauses in the parties‘ investment services agreements which
called for arbitration before a commercial forum).
9. Unlike section 913 of Dodd-Frank, section 921 is not limited to retail customers.
10. Dodd-Frank, § 921. Self-Regulatory Organization (SRO) is defined in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 3(a)(26), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (2006).
FINRA is the SRO for all United States broker-dealers. About the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Oct. 2,
2010). There is no SRO for investment advisers. By its terms, Dodd-Frank does not give
the SEC the authority to limit or prohibit PDAAs with respect to state law claims, which
account for the largest number of FINRA claims. Arbitration and Mediation: Dispute
Resolution
Statistics,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm
(last
visited Oct. 2, 2010). See infra notes 245-248 and accompanying text for discussion of this
issue.
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First, in Part III, I argue that the fiduciary duty principle is not helpful
in establishing standards of care and competence to judge the performance
of investment advice providers, whether investment advisers or brokerdealers. Fiduciary duty is too amorphous to establish a standard of
conduct, the breach of which can cause serious consequences, and is
inapposite in the context of individuals and firms that reasonably expect to
profit from their services. Retail investor protection will be better
advanced if the applicable standards of conduct focus on professionalism.
Accordingly, broker-dealers and investment advisers should be held to
professional standards of care and competence.
Second, in Part IV, I propose, for adoption by the SEC, federal
professional standards of care and competence for broker-dealers and
investment advisers. These include a core set of principles setting forth
minimum standards that the parties cannot disclaim. Additional standards
would be applicable whenever the investment advice provider invites the
investor‘s reliance on its advice and the investor does in fact so rely.
Finally, in Part V, I address investors‘ remedies and the debate over
mandatory securities arbitration. Currently, under federal law, most
investors can recover damages for harm caused by poor investment advice
only if they can establish fraud, which requires proof of scienter.11 Despite
the frequent expression of the need to improve retail investor protection, at
no time did Congress give serious consideration to amending federal
securities legislation to provide an explicit damages remedy for careless
and incompetent investment advice. It is unlikely, under the United States
Supreme Court‘s current approach to implying causes of action, that the
Court will create a private damages remedy for breach of any SEC
standards. Unless it does, SEC adoption of standards of conduct (whether
based on fiduciary duty or professionalism) would not create any additional
federal remedies for investors. The advantage of securities arbitration from
retail investors‘ perspective is that they may be able to recover damages
despite the unavailability of a legal remedy. If the SEC determines to
prohibit mandatory securities arbitration of claims based on federal
securities law and SEC and SRO rules, the ability of retail investors—
particularly those with small claims—to recover damages for careless and
incompetent investment advice may be substantially reduced.

11. See my earlier work, Barbara Black, Transforming Rhetoric into Reality: A Federal
Remedy for Negligent Brokerage Advice, 8 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 101 (2006), for
a discussion of the need for a federal negligence remedy.
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THE STATUS QUO AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS (AND LACK
THEREOF)

A.

Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers
The broker-dealer industry is large and complex and encompasses a
wide variety of activities beyond the brokerage activities of executing
trades and providing investment advice.12 It is also a highly regulated
industry. Broker-dealers and their salespersons (known technically as
―associated persons‖ or ―registered representatives‖13) are regulated under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act),14 which provides
for regulation over virtually every aspect of the business.15 While the SEC
has authority to adopt federal standards of competence16 and has direct
authority over broker-dealers and their associated persons,17 FINRA, as the
SRO for broker-dealers, is the principal regulator,18 over which the SEC
exercises oversight authority.19 Salespersons of broker-dealers are subject
to licensing requirements, including examinations administered by
FINRA.20 State securities commissioners also regulate broker-dealers and
associated persons.21
In contrast, the investment advisory industry is less complex, since its
12. NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §
4.01 (4th ed. 2010).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(18) (2006) (using the term ―associated person[s]‖); see also
Registered Representatives Brochure: Registration, Testing, and Qualifications, FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/QualificationsExams/RegisteredRep
s/Brochure/P009865 (last visited Oct. 2, 2010) (using the term ―registered representatives‖).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2006), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
15. Id. § 78o-3.
16. Id. § 78o(b)(7), (c)(2)(D).
17. The SEC‘s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations conducts
nationwide examinations and inspections, Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM‘N
(SEC),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie.shtml (last modified Mar. 19, 2010), and the SEC‘s
Division of Enforcement investigates possible violations and brings enforcement
proceedings, Division of Enforcement, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce.shtml
(last modified Jul. 22, 2010).
18. See generally About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, supra note 10
(describing FINRA‘s regulatory activities); see also POSER & FANTO, supra note 12, § 4.01
(―It is doubtful whether any regulated industry has been allowed to regulate itself to the
degree that the securities industry has.‖).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3.
20. See
FINRA Registration and Examination Requirements,
FINRA,
http://www.finra.org/Industry/Compliance/Registration/QualificationsExams/p011051 (last
updated July 16, 2010) (outlining the categories of registered principals and their
corresponding examination requirements).
21. See Role of State Securities Regulators, N. AM. SEC. ADM‘RS ASS‘N (NASAA),
http://www.nasaa.org/About_NASAA/Role_of_State_Securities_Regulators/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2010) (describing the various duties of state securities regulators).
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principal function is providing investment advice,22 and less regulated.
Investment advisers (but not investment adviser representatives) are
regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the Advisers Act),23
which places few substantive burdens on investment advisers.24 The
Advisers Act does not provide for industry self-regulation. Instead, the
SEC is the principal regulator of larger investment advisers, and states
regulate the smaller investment advisers as well as investment adviser
representatives.25 The Advisers Act does not establish qualifications for
investment advisers and does not require that investment advisers or their
representatives pass any examinations,26 although many states have
examination requirements.27
B.

Standards of Conduct for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers

Neither the Exchange Act nor the Advisers Act explicitly sets forth a
standard of conduct to which broker-dealers or investment advisers,
respectively, must adhere. Federal and state case law have filled in the
gaps and have subjected broker-dealers and investment advisers to different
standards.
Federal courts have not derived from the Exchange Act or its
legislative history a federal standard of conduct for broker-dealers and
associated persons in their dealings with investors. Although the Supreme
Court has never directly addressed the issue, it has recognized the brokerdealer relationship as giving rise to a fiduciary relationship in one situation:
22. See generally 1 TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN T. SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS § 1.01(B) (2d ed. 2001) (describing the services
provided by investment advisers).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006), amended by Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
24. The Act is viewed largely as a disclosure, record-keeping and anti-fraud statute.
Barry P. Barbash & Jai Massari, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940: Regulation by
Accretion, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 627-28 (2008); see also Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873,
876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (describing the Advisers Act as mainly a registration and anti-fraud
statute).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a).
26. In 1975, the SEC sought amendments to address what has been described as ―the
most serious defect‖ in the Advisers Act, 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES
REGULATION 3397 (3d ed. 1991), but they failed to pass. FRANKEL & SCHWING supra note
22, §1.02(A)(1)(a).
27. See
Exams:
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
NASAA,
http://www.nasaa.org/Industry___Regulatory_Resources/Exams/926.cfm#14 (last visited
Oct. 2, 2010) (noting that most states have examination requirements to become an
investment adviser); see also Investment Advisers: Frequently Asked Questions, NASAA,
http://www.nasaa.org/Industry___Regulatory_Resources/Investment_Advisers/445.cfm#1
(noting the state examination requirements to become an investment adviser) (last visited
Oct. 2, 2010).
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when the broker-dealer has the power to affect trades in the account
without the customer‘s authorization.28 Lower federal courts apply agency
principles and generally treat broker-dealers as salespersons who owe a
fiduciary duty to investors (referred to as ―customers‖) with
nondiscretionary accounts only with respect to their responsibilities to
execute trades.29 The Exchange Act requires a ―national securities
association‖ (i.e., FINRA) to adopt membership rules ―to promote just and
equitable principles of trade,‖30 and FINRA rules require members to
―observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade‖ in the conduct of their business.31 The most important
conduct rule is the ―suitability‖ rule, National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) Rule 2310.32 Rule 2310 imposes on broker-dealers
obligations, when making recommendations, to conduct due diligence both
to know their customer33 and to know the security, so that any
recommended security is suitable for the customer, based on the investor‘s
other securities holdings and her financial situation, objectives and needs.34
In contrast, federal law recognizes that investment advisers owe a
fiduciary duty to those investors with whom they have an advisory
relationship, who are referred to as clients. Although the Advisers Act
does not call investment advisers ―fiduciaries‖ or refer to a ―fiduciary
duty,‖ the Supreme Court, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc.,35 relied on the statute‘s legislative history to find ―congressional
recognition ‗of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory
relationship.‘‖36 In a later opinion, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.

28. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002) (referring to a broker‘s fiduciary duty in
the context of a discretionary account).
29. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999)
(stating that the fiduciary obligation between broker and customer is limited to the narrow
task of consummating the transaction requested).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2006).
31. FINRA
R.
2010
(FINRA
2008),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=6905.
32. Because FINRA has not yet completed the consolidation of the New York Stock
Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) rules necessitated by the
2007 merger, NASD Rule 2310 remains the operative provision. NASD R. 2310 (NASD
1996),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4315.
33. The broker-dealer must make reasonable efforts to obtain relevant information
about the customer, including financial status, tax status, and investment objectives. NASD
R. 2310(b).
34. The rule makes clear that suitability determinations must be made on a portfolio
basis. NASD R. 2310(a).
35. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
36. Id. at 191-92. In another part of the opinion, the Court acknowledged that Congress
recognized the investment adviser to be a fiduciary. Id. at 194.
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v. Lewis,37 the Court reaffirmed that the Advisers Act established ―federal
fiduciary standards‖ for investment advisers. Capital Gains also identified
the ―basic function‖ of investment advisers—―furnishing to clients on a
personal basis competent, unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the
sound management of their investments.‖38 Neither Capital Gains nor
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, however, presented the Court with the
opportunity to explore concretely the nature of fiduciary duties owed by an
investment adviser providing individualized investment advice,39 and there
is limited case law or regulatory guidance on the issue. The SEC requires
investment advisers to adopt a code of ethics setting forth their standards of
business conduct that ―must reflect their fiduciary obligations,‖40 but the
agency itself has never adopted conduct rules that explicate the fiduciary
duty concept. In 1994 the SEC proposed a suitability rule for investment
advisers that was substantially the same as the broker-dealer‘s suitability
rule but derived from the fiduciary duty standard; it was never adopted.41
Because broker-dealers and investment advisers compete for
investors‘ business, each industry frequently takes the opportunity to
explain how its regulatory scheme better protects investors. Thus, brokerdealers point to the self-regulatory structure as affording greater investor
protection;42 investment advisers, in turn, refer to the higher fiduciary
standard.43

37. 444 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1979) (citing earlier Supreme Court opinions and legislative
history).
38. 375 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added).
39. Capital Gains involved a financial publication; Transamerica held that investors
had no private cause of action for damages under the Advisers Act.
40. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1 (2010).
41. Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers; Custodial
Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,464 (proposed Mar. 16,
1994) [hereinafter Suitability of Investment Advice]. The SEC asserted that the proposed
rule was a codification of existing SEC interpretations.
42. See, e.g., Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets—
Part II: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 165
(2009) (prepared statement of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Financial
Industry
Regulatory
Association),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg144/pdf/CHRG-111shrg144.pdf
(asserting
that an independent regulatory organization for investment advisers would prevent future
harm to investors).
43. See, e.g., Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection,
Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance
Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 246 (2009) (statement of
David G. Tittsworth, Executive Director and Executive Vice President, Investment Adviser
Association),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:55810.pdf (asserting that not holding
brokers to a fiduciary standard creates confusion in client expectations).
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Investors’ Remedies for Harm Caused by Poor Investment Advice

Investors have no federal remedy to compensate them for losses
caused by investment advice provided by incompetent and careless
investment advice providers, whether a broker-dealer or an investment
adviser, in trading transactions. Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of
1933 (the Securities Act)44 is the only express private damages remedy for
negligent advice; in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,45 the Supreme Court held that
this provision did not apply to trading transactions. The Court also, in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,46 limited the implied remedy under Exchange
Act Section 10(b)47 and Rule 10b-548 to require scienter and exclude
negligence actions. While the Supreme Court held that sections 17(a)(2)
and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act49 apply to negligent advice in trading
transactions,50 the federal appeals courts currently assume that the Court
would not recognize an implied cause of action under these sections.51 The
only investors‘ remedy in the Advisers Act is a limited rescissionary
remedy; there is no provision for compensating losses caused by negligent
investment advisers.52 Finally, the lower federal courts do not recognize
the SEC‘s shingle theory—that broker-dealers make an implied
representation to their customers that they will deal with them fairly and in
accordance with the standards of the profession—outside of SEC
enforcement actions53 and refuse to imply private causes of action for
breach of SRO rules.54 State courts may allow investors to recover under

44. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006).
45. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
46. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)-(3) (2006).
50. In Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the
Securities Act do not require scienter. 446 U.S. 680, 700 (1980). In U.S. v. Naftalin, the
Supreme Court held that section 17(a) of the Securities Act applies to trading transactions.
441 U.S. 768, 777 (1979).
51. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
section 17 of the Securities Act did not create an implied private right of action). But see
AFA Private Equity Fund 1 v. Miresco Inv. Servs., No. 02-74650, 2005 WL 2417116, at *5
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2005) (following 6th Circuit precedent to the contrary).
52. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
53. See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969) (distinguishing private
damages suits from enforcement actions); Roebuck v. Guttman, 678 F. Supp. 68, 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Graphic Enters., Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335,
342 n.12 (D. Minn. 1971) (same); see also Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?,
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1295-97 (1995) (concluding that private plaintiffs cannot
recover damages under the shingle theory).
54. See, e.g., Gurfein v. Ameritrade, Inc., 312 F. App‘x 410, 414 (2d Cir. 2009)
(holding that a customer could not sue for breach of SRO best execution rule).
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various state law theories in some circumstances.
Retail investors who purchase securities in a registered public offering
from a statutory seller do have a negligence claim under Section 12(a)(2) of
the Securities Act.55 For example, retail investors who purchase shares in
mutual funds recommended by their broker may have claims for inaccurate
oral communications related to the prospectus.56
Ever since the Supreme Court held, in Shearson/American Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, that PDAAs were enforceable under the federal securities
laws,57 virtually all customers‘ disputes with their broker-dealers and
registered representatives are resolved through arbitration in the FINRA (or
its predecessors NASD and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)) forum.
Because there is no SRO for investment advisers, there is less information
available about arbitration of disputes involving investment advisers.
However, it appears that arbitration before one of the commercial forums is
the customary method of resolving disputes between investors and
investment advisers as well.58 Arbitration is an equitable forum; investors
are not required to state a legal cause of action, and arbitrators are not
required to apply the law. Although few arbitration panels provide reasons
for their awards, it is generally believed that investors frequently do
recover damages from broker-dealers and investment advisers for careless
or incompetent advice.59
D.

Financial Reform Legislation
1.

Harmonizing Standards of Conduct
The genesis of Dodd-Frank was the June 2009 U.S. Department of
Treasury‘s white paper on financial regulatory reform. 60 It identified the
problem of investor confusion because ―investment advisers and broker55. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006) (setting forth affirmative defense of ―reasonable
care‖).
56. See infra notes 200-206 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties
associated with a section 12(a)(2) claim.
57. 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987).
58. Courts routinely enforce PDAAs in light of the Court‘s post-McMahon proarbitration policy. See, e.g., Bakas v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D.
Minn. 2009) (holding that the investor‘s claims against an investment adviser were subject
to arbitration). The SEC, however, has never withdrawn its Opinion Letter referred to in
Bakas that states that investment advisers could not require PDAAs. McEldowney Fin.
Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,373 (Oct. 17, 1986).
59. See generally Barbara Black & Jill Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The
Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2002) (examining the role
of law in arbitration of investors‘ disputes with their broker-dealers).
60. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf.
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dealers are regulated under different statutory and regulatory frameworks,
even though the services they provide often are virtually identical from a
retail investor‘s perspective.‖61 Its initiatives ―to increase fairness for
investors‖62 included measures to ―[e]stablish a fiduciary duty for brokerdealers offering investment advice and harmonize the regulation of
investment advisers and broker-dealers.‖63 The white paper contained three
proposals:
[1.] requiring that broker-dealers who provide investment advice
about securities to investors have the same fiduciary obligations
as registered investment advisers;
[2.] providing simple and clear disclosure to investors regarding
the scope of the terms of their relationships with investment
professionals; and
[3.] prohibiting certain conflict of interests and sales practices
that are contrary to the interests of investors.64
Although the white paper‘s use of the phrase ―harmonizing the
regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers‖65 at least invites a
comprehensive review of the regulatory provisions of the Exchange Act
and the Advisers Act in order to determine the optimal regulatory scheme
for all investment advice providers, in fact Congress had little energy for
this. Instead, a consensus emerged early on in the debate for harmonizing
the standards of conduct applicable to those who provide personal
investment advice to retail investors, which became synonymous with
extending the federal fiduciary duty standard applicable to investment
advisers to broker-dealers that offered investment advice. The major
industry groups supported at least the concept, although they hotly debated
implementation. The investment adviser industry and consumer groups
supported amending the Advisers Act to eliminate the broker-dealer
exclusion from the statutory definition of ―investment adviser,‖66 while the
broker-dealer industry supported legislation that would delegate authority
to the SEC to study the matter further and develop appropriate conduct
61. Id. at 71.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 72. This paper addresses only the proposal for creating the same fiduciary
obligations for broker-dealers and investment advisers. For analysis of the conflicts of
interest issue, see Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 424-28 (2010).
65. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 60, at 15.
66. Broker-dealers are explicitly excluded from the IAA‘s broad definition of
―investment adviser‖ so long as (1) their performance of advisory services is ―solely
incidental‖ to the broker-dealer business and (2) they receive ―no special compensation‖ for
their services. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2006); see also Barbara Black, Brokers and
Advisers – What’s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 33 (2005) (outlining the
different legal obligations that brokers and investment advisors owe their customers).
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rules consistent with a fiduciary duty principle.67
The versions of the House and Senate financial reform legislation, in
turn, reflected those different approaches. In December 2009 the House
passed a bill that would require the SEC to promulgate rules to provide that
the standard of conduct for all brokers, dealers and investment advisers,
―when providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers[,] . . . shall be to act in the best interest of the customer without
regard to the financial or other interest of the [advice provider]‖68 and the
―standard of conduct shall be no less stringent than the standard applicable
to investment advisers.‖69
The original Senate version, in contrast, would have eliminated the
broker-dealer exclusion from the definition of ―investment adviser‖ in the
Advisers Act,70 thus subjecting all broker-dealers that offered investment
advice to regulation under the Advisers Act. The Senate Banking
Committee, however, never voted on that version, and in March 2010, the
committee instead approved a revised legislative proposal that was
included in the version passed by the Senate on May 19, 2010. The Senate
version called for the SEC to conduct a one-year study.71 Thereafter, if the
study identified any gaps or overlap in the standards in the protection of
retail investors relating to standards of care, the SEC was required to
commence a rulemaking to address the deficiencies within two years after
enactment of the statute.
Throughout the reconciliation process that produced the final
legislation, industry groups engaged in intense lobbying for their
positions.72 The brokerage industry essentially won this debate. Section
67. For a comparison of these views, see, e.g., Capital Markets Regulatory Reform:
Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and
Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th
Cong. 227 (2009) (Testimony of David G. Tittsworth, Executive Director and Executive
Vice President, Investment Adviser Association) (strongly supporting extending an
investment adviser‘s fiduciary duty to brokers who provide investment advice); Capital
Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, Enhancing Oversight of
Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 227 (2009) (Testimony of John Taft, Head of U.S.
Wealth Management, RBC Wealth Management, Chairman of the Private Client Group
Steering Committee, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association) (agreeing with
proposal to delegate to the SEC broad authority to create the rules that would govern the
federal fiduciary standard).
68. Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §
7103(a) (as passed by House of Representatives, Dec. 2, 2009).
69. Id.
70. Restoring American Financial Stability Act, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 913(a)
(discussion draft, as introduced to S. Banking Comm., Nov. 10, 2009).
71. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 913(b)
(Senate Amendment No. 3739, April 29, 2010).
72. See Mark Schoeff Jr., Congress Passes Fiduciary Ball to SEC, INVESTMENTNEWS
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913 of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to conduct a six-month study to
evaluate:
(1) the effectiveness of existing legal or regulatory standards of
care for brokers, dealers, investment advisers, persons associated
with brokers or dealers, and persons associated with investment
advisers for providing personalized investment advice and
recommendations about securities to retail customers . . . ; [and]
(2) whether there are legal or regulatory gaps, shortcomings, or
overlaps in legal or regulatory standards in the protection of retail
customers relating to the standards of care for brokers, dealers,
investment advisers, persons associated with brokers or dealers,
and persons associated with investment advisers for providing
personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers that should be addressed by rule or statute . . . .73
The statute also sets forth a long list of considerations that the SEC
should take into account in conducting its study, including investor
confusion, resources devoted to regulatory enforcement, the potential
impact on retail investors of imposing a fiduciary duty on broker-dealers,
the potential impact of eliminating the broker-dealer exclusion from the
definition of investment adviser under the Advisers Act, and potential costs
from any additional regulation.74 After completion of the study, the SEC
may commence a rulemaking to address the standards of care and to
improve regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers.
The statute amends the Exchange Act to give the SEC the authority to
establish a standard of care for broker-dealers and their associated persons
when providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers that is the same as the standard of conduct applicable to
investment advisers.75 The statute imposes three limits on the SEC‘s
authority: (1) the receipt of compensation based on commission or other
standard compensation for the sale of securities shall not, in and of itself,
be considered a violation of the standard;76 (2) ―nothing in this section shall
require a broker or dealer or registered representative to have a continuing
duty of care or loyalty to the customer after providing personalized
investment advice about securities;‖77 and (3) broker-dealers that sell only
proprietary or other limited range of products do not, for that reason alone,

(June 27, 2010), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100627/FREE/100629911
(identifying several of the groups involved in the debate).
73. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010).
74. Id. § 913(c).
75. Id. § 913(g)(1).
76. Id.
77. Id. As I discuss infra note 185 and accompanying text, this limits substantially the
imposition of a meaningful standard of care for broker-dealers.
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violate the standard of care.78 With respect to the latter type of brokerdealers, the SEC may require them to provide notice to each retail customer
and obtain the consent or acknowledgement of the customer.79 The statute,
in turn, amends the Advisers Act to give the SEC the authority to establish
a standard of conduct for all broker-dealers and investment advisers, when
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers, ―to act in the best interest of the customer without regard to the
financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser
providing the advice.‖80 It bears emphasis that section 913(g) does not
require the SEC to promulgate any conduct rules, but it does set forth two
requirements for any standards of conduct it may adopt: (1) ―any material
conflicts of interest shall be disclosed and may be consented to by the
customer‖81 and (2) the standard of conduct ―shall be no less stringent than
the standard applicable to investment advisers.‖82
Finally, the statute addresses harmonization of enforcement and
amends the Exchange Act and the Advisers Act to mandate a ―parity of
enforcement‖ for violations of the standards of conduct applicable to
investment advice providers providing personalized investment advice to
retail investors. Both the Exchange Act and the Advisers Act are amended
to state that the SEC ―shall seek to prosecute and sanction violators of the
standard of conduct applicable to a broker or dealer providing personalized
investment advice about securities to a retail customer . . . to same extent as
the [SEC] prosecutes and sanctions violators of the standard of conduct
applicable to an investment advisor[sic].‖83

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 913(g)(2).
81. Id. The statute also requires the SEC to ―facilitate the provision of simple and clear
disclosures‖ to investors about the terms of their relationships with their investment advice
providers, including conflicts of interest and to ―examine and, where appropriate,
promulgate rules prohibiting or restricting certain sales practices, conflicts of interest, and
compensation schemes . . . that the [SEC] deems contrary to the public interest and the
protection of investors.‖ Id.
82. Id. The statute refers to Advisers Act sections 206(1) and (2), as well as 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6, which makes it illegal for investment advisers to engage in fraudulent activities or
to engage in any practice ―which operates as a fraud or deceit . . . .‖
83. Dodd-Frank, § 913(h). It is not clear what Congressional concern motivated this
provision. The SEC currently oversees about 11,500 investment advisers and 5,400 brokerdealers; the number of investment advisers registered with the SEC has grown by 32% since
2005. SEC, IN BRIEF: FY 2011 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2 (Feb. 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy11congbudgjust.pdf. In the past five years the SEC has
brought a total of 3,195 actions (both civil and administrative), of which 427 (13.4%) were
brought against broker-dealers and 409 (12.8%) against investment advisers. See SEC,
SELECT
SEC
AND
MARKET
DATA
3
(2005–2009),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (providing this data in table 2 for all five fiscal years).
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Mandatory Securities Arbitration

Ever since Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,84 there has
been ongoing debate over the fairness of SRO securities arbitration.85
Many investors perceive the FINRA arbitration forum as unfair,86 although
academics who have studied the forum award it high marks for meeting
most generally recognized standards of fairness.87 In 2009 Congress
considered, but did not pass, legislation to invalidate PDAAs in
employment and consumer arbitration and expressly included securities
arbitration within the definition.88 The Treasury white paper recommended
an SEC study of the issue as well as an amendment of the federal securities
laws to give the SEC authority to prohibit PDAAs in brokerage and
investment advisory contracts with retail investors.89 Section 921 of DoddFrank (which is essentially the same provision contained in the House and
Senate versions)90 gives the SEC the authority to prohibit, or to impose
conditions or limitations on the use of, ―agreements that require customers
or clients . . . to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising under the
Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rule of
a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of
conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of
investors.‖91 In contrast with section 913 and its required study on
84. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
85. See Black & Gross, supra note 59, at 994 (describing current perceptions).
86. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical
Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 349,
389-91 (2008).
87. See MICHAEL PERINO, REPORT TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
REGARDING ARBITRATOR CONFLICT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN NASD AND NYSE
SECURITIES ARBITRATION (2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf
(finding that the current SRO conflict disclosure requirements generally appear adequate);
see also Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REV. 1, 3-12
(2004) (discussing the author‘s view that securities arbitration is a fairer process than many
consumer/employee arbitration processes); Jill Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The
Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 518 (2008)
(expressing the author‘s belief that current regulation of securities arbitration does ensure
that it is fair to investors and concluding that SEC oversight sufficiently regulates the
fairness of securities arbitration).
88. See Jill Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV.
1174, 1177-1178 (2010) (noting that 2009 legislation to invalidate PDAAs expressly
extended coverage to securities industry disputes through its definition of ―consumer
dispute,‖ but also noting that this legislation did not pass).
89. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 60, at 72.
90. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 913(b)
(Senate Amendment No. 3739, April 29, 2010); Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection
Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 7103(a) (as passed by House of Representatives,
Dec. 2, 2009).
91. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 921(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010)
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standards of conduct, section 921 is solely enabling and does not require
the SEC to take any action.
By its terms, the statutory language imposes a significant limitation on
the SEC‘s authority to prohibit the use of PDAAs; its authority does not
extend to future disputes arising under state law. The limitation, and the
complications it introduces into future considerations of the policy
question, are discussed later in this article.92
Finally, it should be noted what is not included in Dodd-Frank.
Although the Obama administration identified ―increas[ing] fairness for
investors‖ as a goal,93 at no point did the administration or Congress
consider amending federal securities legislation to provide investors with a
damages remedy for careless and incompetent investment advice. To the
contrary, Dodd-Frank provides no explicit remedy for an investor harmed
by an investment advice provider‘s negligence or breach of fiduciary duty.
Thus, after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, investors who purchased
securities in trading transactions94 are still without a federal damages
remedy unless they can establish fraud.95
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OR PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS?
Section 913 of Dodd-Frank reflects a well-placed skepticism about
whether different standards of care for broker-dealers and investment
advisers make sense when they provide essentially the same service—
personalized advice to retail investors—and solicit business by encouraging
trust and reliance on their diligence and expertise.96 As discussed above,97
(emphasis added).
92. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
complications that may arise from the statutory language‘s limitation on the SEC‘s authority
to prohibit the use of PDAAs).
93. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 60, at 15.
94. Retail investors who purchase mutual funds recommended by their brokers can
bring a negligence claim under the Securities Act § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006),
but courts have not been receptive to these claims. See, e.g., In re Morgan Stanley Info.
Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2010) (dismissing claims based on failure to
disclose conflicts of interest); DeBenedictis v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 492 F.3d 209, 216 (3d
Cir. 2007) (dismissing claims based on failures to disclose involving Class B shares);
Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distribs., Inc., 420 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2005) (dismissing
claims based on failures to disclose involving Class B shares).
95. The possibility that federal courts might imply a private cause of action under a
standard of care rule adopted by the SEC is discussed infra notes 229-241 and
accompanying text.
96. See Lynn A. Stout, Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-15, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442023 (detailing the importance of trust in the securities
markets).
97. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010); see
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section 913 directs the SEC to conduct a study on the current regulation of
broker-dealers and investment advisers and gives the SEC the authority to
adopt a fiduciary duty standard for broker-dealers. In Part III, I first
examine the underpinnings of the fiduciary duty concept and conclude that
it does not provide a workable standard to assess the performance of
investment advice providers. I then argue that professionalism should be
the foundation for establishing appropriate standards of care and
competence for all investment advice providers when they provide advice
to retail investors.
A.

The Enduring Mystery of Fiduciary Duty

Lawyers, judges, and academics invoke the fiduciary duty concept in
order to convey a strong ethical duty to be protective of another‘s interest.
The phrase connotes a tone of high mindedness, an altruistic regard for
another. Recall Judge Cardozo‘s often-quoted language:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm‘s length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.98
Fiduciaries appear in many forms and in many areas of the law; in the
business setting alone, controlling shareholders, directors, partners,
investment advisers to mutual funds, and trustees of ERISA pension plans
are common examples. Thus, determining the principles underpinning
fiduciary relationships has proved elusive.99 The difficulty is exacerbated
because judges frequently use the term as a conclusionary label whenever
they find injury to a vulnerable party without much analysis of the factors
deemed relevant in arriving at that conclusion. Many scholars have
explored the concept of the fiduciary relationship in an effort to ascertain
its defining characteristics. In the corporate and securities fields, the
scholarship of Tamar Frankel and Deborah DeMott has been especially
influential.
In the view of Professor DeMott, there is no one core principle in
identifying fiduciary obligations, beyond the descriptive statement that ―the
also supra text accompanying note 73 (discussing section 913 of Dodd-Frank).
98. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928).
99. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation,
1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 879 (1988) (―Recognition that the law of fiduciary obligation is
situation-specific should be the starting point for any further analysis.‖); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 425
(1993) (―The many agency relations that fall under the ‗fiduciary‘ banner are so diverse that
a single rule could not cover all without wreaking havoc.‖).
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fiduciary obligation is a device that enables the law to respond to a range of
situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one person‘s discretion ought
to be controlled because of the characteristics of that person‘s relationship
with another.‖100 Accordingly, careful analysis requires asking two related,
but distinct, questions: (1) is there a fiduciary relationship, and (2) what
duties are created by that fiduciary relationship. Thoughtful judges have
recognized this; as Justice Frankfurter famously stated:
[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis . . . To
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a
fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these
obligations?101
Professor Frankel, in her analysis of fiduciary law, finds as a unifying
theme the creation of a relationship for the benefit of one party because of
that party‘s dependence on another for a particular service.102 The central
features of a fiduciary relationship are that ―the fiduciary serves as a
substitute for the entrustor‖103 and ―the fiduciary obtains power . . . for the
sole purpose of enabling the fiduciary to act effectively.‖104 Consistent
with this approach, she asserts that ―all fiduciary relations give rise to the
problem of abuse of power, that the purpose of fiduciary law should be to
solve this problem, and that the differences in the rules applicable to
various fiduciary relations stem from differences in the extent of the
problem.‖105
Both approaches require an analysis of the nature of the relationship to
assess the degree of vulnerability of one party to another. Professor
DeMott focuses on imposing duties to limit one party‘s discretion for the
protection of the other, while Professor Frankel focuses specifically on the
danger of abuse of power. Neither approach, however, provides useful
guidance in determining the appropriate standard of care in providing
investment advice. It makes sense to talk of a need to limit discretion or
find an abuse of power in instances of obvious forms of misconduct (such
as misappropriation of funds) or in self-dealing transactions. It is
problematic to describe deficiencies in advice-giving services as resulting
from unchecked discretion or an abuse of power. Indeed, the Restatement
(Third) of Agency (for which Professor DeMott is the Reporter) takes the
100. DeMott, supra note 99, at 915.
101. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
102. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983).
103. Id. at 808.
104. Id. at 809.
105. Id. at 807-08; see also Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L.
REV. 1209, 1212 (1995) [hereinafter Default Rules] (―In sum, fiduciary rules reflect a
consensual arrangement covering special situations in which fiduciaries promise to perform
services for entrustors and receive substantial power to effectuate the performance of the
services, while entrustors cannot efficiently monitor the fiduciaries‘ performance.‖).
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position that fiduciary obligations are limited to duties of loyalty and not
competence.106 Accordingly, extending the fiduciary duty principle to all
investment advice providers does little to advance the analysis of the
appropriate level of care and competence that an investor can reasonably
expect from her investment adviser or broker-dealer. The debate over
fiduciary duty is largely off-point.
Finally, Professors DeMott and Frankel also identify the importance
of the moral theme in fiduciary regulation. Thus, judicial opinions use
language of moral obligation to distinguish fiduciary from contractual
obligations,107 to emphasize the altruistic nature of fiduciary
relationships,108 and in recognition of the vulnerability of the entrustor.109
In contrast, law and economics scholars argue that there is nothing special
about fiduciary relationships; they are nothing more than contractual
arrangements with high transaction costs.110 While I do not agree that
fiduciary obligations have no place in the law, the objections of the law and
economics scholars have relevance in the context of investment advice
providers‘ relationships with their investors. These relationships are
always contractual, entered into by both parties for the purpose of making a
profit. While investment advice providers cultivate and encourage retail
investors‘ reliance on their services, there are degrees of vulnerability, and
not all retail investors are the equivalent of the ―widows and orphans‖ that
the law traditionally recognizes as vulnerable. In this context, language of
altruism is inapposite. Indeed, as Professor Laby points out, the core
fiduciary principle of putting another‘s interest ahead of the fiduciary‘s
cannot literally be applied in this context, since it would mean that the
investment advice provider would have to renounce its compensation for its
106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. E (2006) (―It is open to question
whether an agent‘s unconflicted exercise of discretion as to how to best carry out the agent‘s
undertaking implicates fiduciary doctrines.‖); see also Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource
Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2002) (arguing that the duty of
care is not a fiduciary duty).
107. DeMott, supra note 99, at 891. Frankel, supra note 102, at 830.
108. See Frankel, supra note 102, at 830 (―[O]nce an individual undertakes to act as a
fiduciary, he should act to further the interests of another in preference to his own.‖).
109. Id. at 832. See also Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some
Lessons for Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated
Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 671 (1996) (emphasizing the ―pervasiveness of trust‖ in
broker-customer relationships and that brokers seek to win the customers‘ trust, and
customers wish to bestow it).
110. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 99, at 427 (discussing the nature of a
fiduciary relation). For criticism of the contractarians‘ approach, see generally DeMott,
supra note 99, at 902 and Default Rules, supra note 105, at 1211. As Professor Frankel
notes, the difference in approach largely comes down to whether the fiduciary obligation
created by the relationship can be waived; she argues that beneficiaries of the fiduciary
relationship can waive some (but not all) duties owed to them only with informed consent.
Default Rules, supra note 105, at 1212.
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services.111 All investment advice providers face conflicts from the profit
motive in advising investors; these conflicts can be mitigated but not
eliminated. Accordingly, the altruistic language that is an integral aspect of
the fiduciary duty concept is a poor fit in this context and provides at least a
partial explanation for why judicial analysis of these relationships under the
fiduciary duty framework is intellectually unsatisfying. The courts must
resort to the rhetorical flourish because any extended legal analysis would
expose the weakness of the analogy.
This is not to say that rhetoric does not serve a purpose. It can set an
aspirational tone, as Professor Edward Rock has explored in the ―sermons‖
of the Delaware Supreme Court on directors‘ fiduciary duties.112 While this
is valuable, the cost of fiduciary language is high. Because of its vague and
amorphous quality, the fiduciary duty concept does not promote the
development of clear and workable standards that investment advice
providers can incorporate into their business practices, regulators can
consistently enforce, and courts and arbitration panels can apply in
resolving investors‘ claims against their broker-dealers.
The Supreme Court‘s recent opinion in Jones v. Harris Associates
L.P.113 nicely illustrates the difficulties created by the use of a fiduciary
duty standard in federal securities legislation, in this case the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the Company Act). In 1970 Congress amended the
Company Act to improve investor protection and addressed the issue of
excessive fees paid by the mutual fund board to its investment adviser, a
classic conflict of interest situation since the investment adviser and mutual
fund are affiliated companies. Section 36(b) of the Company Act provides
that the investment adviser to a mutual fund ―shall be deemed to have a
fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services,‖
and fund shareholders can sue the investment adviser for breach of that
duty.114 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,115 a Second
Circuit section 36(b) opinion whose approach is endorsed in Harris
Associates, tracked the legislative history on this section, which it
described as ―tortuous‖116 and the Supreme Court, more diplomatically,
described as representing ―a delicate compromise‖117 that resulted in the

111. Laby, supra note 64, at 426.
112. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997). But see William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd,
The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2009) (pointing
out the dangers of the indeterminate fiduciary duty approach).
113. 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
115. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
116. Id. at 928.
117. Harris Associates, 130 S. Ct. at 1423.
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statutory reference to fiduciary duty that is ―hardly pellucid.‖118 Thus,
Harris Associates presents a cautionary tale about uncertainties created by
the political decision to use the felicitous phrase rather than develop a
workable standard. The end result is an approach that the Court concedes
―may lack sharp analytical clarity.‖119
Moreover, the history of section 36(b), culminating in Harris
Associates, supports the argument that the legislative use of ―fiduciary
duty‖ results in a rhetorical flourish rather than a meaningful investors‘
remedy. The statutory fiduciary duty is really an ersatz fiduciary duty.
First, the statute provides that the shareholder has the burden of proof to
establish a breach of fiduciary duty,120 whereas in a classic conflict-ofinterest relationship the fiduciary has the burden of establishing fairness.
Second, the outcome of Harris Associates makes clear that plaintiffs will
rarely prevail.121 The holding—that an investment adviser is liable if the
fee is ―so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to
the services rendered and could not have been the product of arm‘s length
bargaining‖122—sets forth a standard that is close to, if not identical with, a
―corporate waste‖ standard—generally expressed as ―an exchange of
corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to lie
beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to
trade.‖123 Plaintiffs rarely prevail under a corporate waste standard that
Congress expressly rejected. After Harris Associates the investment
adviser has only to meet the standards of the marketplace and meets a
―fiduciary standard‖ through arms-length bargaining, in marked contrast to
Judge Cardozo‘s approach.
In conclusion, adoption of a fiduciary standard is unlikely to improve
the quality of investment advice and advance retail investor protection. I
argue that instead the standard of conduct for investment advice providers
should be based on professionalism. In the next section, I develop the
rationale for professionalism.
B.

The Importance of Professionalism in the Securities Industry

As the Court has frequently stated, a fundamental purpose, common to
the federal securities statutes, is to achieve ―a high standard of business

118. Id. at 1426.
119. Id. at 1430.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1).
121. Indeed, plaintiffs have never prevailed in court under section 36(b). Mercer E.
Bullard, Dura, Loss Causation, and Mutual Funds: A Requiem for Private Claims?, 76 U.
CIN. L. REV. 559, 560 n.5 (2008).
122. Harris Associates, 130 S. Ct. at 1426.
123. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
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ethics in the securities industry.‖124 Failure to act professionally is
recognized as unethical conduct.125 The need for professionalism in the
selling of securities is a consistent theme in the Exchange Act, dating from
its initial enactment as reform legislation intended to restore public
confidence in the U.S. capital markets.126 In subsequent amendments,
Congress frequently sought to elevate the level of professionalism. For
example, in 1964, Congress strengthened qualification standards for
broker-dealers, in recognition of the fact that greater participation in the
securities markets by retail investors called for more professionalism on the
part of broker-dealers.127 In 1975, Congress adopted major reforms to the
self-regulatory system to better ―police the conduct and strengthen the
professional standards of professional participants in [the United States]
securities markets.‖128 As part of that reform, the SROs were required to
adopt and enforce rules that promoted ―just and equitable principles of
trade.‖129 In 1990, Congress added provisions to raise the standard of
brokers‘ practices in sales of penny stocks that are frequently sold to
124. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); SEC v.
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979);
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972). For a discussion
of professional ethics more generally, see John Hooker, Professional Ethics: Does It Matter
Which Hat We Wear? 2 (Carnegie Mellon Univ. Tepper Sch. of Bus., Working Paper,
2006),
available
at
http://tepper.cmu.edu/alumni/lifelong-learning/speakerpresentations/john-hooker-keynote-talk-on-professional-ethics-does-it-matter-which-hat-wewear/index.aspx.
125. See, e.g., Heath v. SEC, 586 F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that SRO rule‘s
concern with unethical conduct is consistent with focus on the ―professionalism of the
securities industry‖).
126. As expressed by an SEC Commissioner who was, for many years, a staff attorney in
its Enforcement Division, ―it is clear that, in enacting the securities laws, Congress intended
to raise the standard of conduct of those playing important roles in the securities market.‖
Manuel F. Cohen & Joel J. Rabin, Broker-Dealer Selling Practice Standards: The
Importance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 691, 694 (1964).
127. The House of Representatives observed ―a [dramatic] increase‖ in ―public
participation in the securities markets[,]‖ particularly among persons having but slight
acquaintance with the intricacies of corporate finance and stock market operations. This
development demands that the selling of securities be conducted in a more professional
manner . . . . H.R. REP. NO. 87-882, at 3 (1961), reprinted in 2 BUREAU OF NAT‘L AFFAIRS
(BNA), FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 1750, 1752 (1983).
128. H. R. REP. NO. 94-123, at 44 (1974), reprinted in 3 BNA, FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, at 2471, 2514.
129. Specifically, the rules of national securities exchanges and national securities
associations were required to promote ―just and equitable principles of trade,‖ 15 U.S.C. §§
78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6) (2006) and standards with respect to ―training, experience and
competence.‖ Id. §§ 78f(c)(3)(A), 78o-3(g)(3)(A)-(B). FINRA Rule 2010 emphasizes
―high standards of commercial honor‖ and ―just and equitable principles of trade‖ for the
protection of investors.
FINRA R. 2010 (FINRA 2008), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=6905.
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unsophisticated retail investors.130
As noted previously, the Advisers Act places few substantive burdens
on investment advisers, does not provide for industry self-regulation, and
does not set qualifications or educational requirements for investment
advisers.131 Thus it is fair to say that the statute does not evidence the same
degree of concern for professionalism found in the Exchange Act.
Nevertheless, Congress has amended the Advisers Act several times to
tighten regulation, most pertinently in 1975, when the registration and
disciplinary procedures were revised to conform more closely to those for
broker-dealers.132 The SEC, moreover, uses its authority under the
antifraud provisions to hold investment advisers to professional standards,
although it typically expresses them as fiduciary obligations.133 Indeed,
whatever ―fiduciary‖ means, Capital Gains makes clear it encompasses an
obligation to act professionally.134
The SEC consistently identifies care and competence as important
components of professional conduct. The agency frequently brings
disciplinary proceedings against broker-dealers and investment advisers for
unprofessional conduct, such as soliciting customers to purchase securities
at excessive mark-ups135 and making unsuitable or uninformed
recommendations.136 FINRA (and its predecessors, NASD and the New
York Stock Exchange) bring disciplinary actions against broker-dealers and
associated persons for unprofessional and unethical conduct; a showing of
130. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
131. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (describing the relatively fewer
substantive burdens on investment advisers).
132. 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, at 3314.
133. See, e.g., Suitability of Investment Advice, supra note 41 (stating that the
investment adviser‘s suitability obligation is enforceable under the antifraud provisions of
the Advisers Act).
134. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963) (―[An]
investment adviser[‘]s . . . basic function [is to] furnish[] to clients[,] on a personal basis[,]
competent, unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the sound management of their
investments . . . . ‖).
135. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1961) (stating
that a broker-dealer ―holds itself out as competent to advise.‖).
136. See, e.g., Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969) (affirming SEC‘s sanctions
against four broker-dealer defendants for fraud in failing to disclose material adverse
information about stocks to customers); Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1961)
(remanding to SEC to clarify findings that broker-dealer‘s statements to customer on
projected stocks were misleading); In re David A. King & King Capital, Exchange Act
Release No. 33167, 55 SEC Docket 1107 (Nov. 9, 1993) (barring unregistered investment
adviser from such a position after he made material misrepresentations to clients to induce
investments); In re Shearson, Hammill & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 7743, 42 SEC
Docket 811, 840 (Nov. 12, 1965) (noting that executive committee of investment advisers
made no effort to investigate ―methods used and representations made to induce customers
to purchase the stock‖).
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bad faith is not required, because customers are entitled to believe that they
will be ―dealt with fairly and in accordance with the standards of the
profession.‖137
State securities commissioners discipline securities
professionals for unprofessional and unethical practices.138
In conclusion, professionalism provides a well-established and clear
principle on which to base standards of conduct for both broker-dealers and
investment advisers when they provide investment advice to retail
investors. In Part IV, I set forth these proposed federal standards of
competence and care.
IV. FEDERAL PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR INVESTMENT ADVICE
PROVIDERS
After the SEC completes the six-month study required by Section 913
of Dodd-Frank,139 it may commence a rulemaking to address standards of
care and to improve regulation of broker-dealers and investment advisers.
Because establishing well-defined and enforceable professional standards is
a better approach than adopting a fiduciary duty standard, I set forth, for
adoption by the SEC, federal standards of care and competence for
investment advice providers.140
These proposed federal standards include four minimum standards
that investment advice providers owe to all retail investors, based on SEC
interpretations, SRO rules, industry standards and common law fiduciary
duty, tort and agency principles. Because these are minimum standards,
the investment advice provider cannot contract out of adherence to these
standards. They may be stated as follows:
(1) Prohibition against Unauthorized Trading. The investment
advice provider must obey the investor‘s instructions and cannot make
decisions pertaining to the account unless the investor has authorized the
investment advice provider to do so.141 Courts and regulators have long
recognized unauthorized trading as an egregious example of unprofessional

137. Heath v. SEC, 586 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming SEC order that affirmed
NYSE‘s finding that associated person engaged in unethical conduct when he disclosed
confidential client information and violated the ―just and equitable principles of trade‖ rule;
no finding of bad faith required).
138. See, e.g., Knowles v. Montana ex rel. Lindeen, 222 P.3d 595 (Mont. 2009)
(affirming securities commissioner‘s findings that failure to conduct suitability analysis
before customers signed sales documents was an ―unethical practice‖).
139. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
140. The proposal set forth herein is a refinement of my earlier proposal contained in
Black, supra note 11.
141. Agents must obey their principal‘s lawful instructions. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 8.09 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385 (1958).
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conduct.142
(2) Duty of Best Execution. When executing transactions on behalf
of an investor, the investment advice provider must use reasonable
diligence to obtain the best available price.143 The duty of best execution is
a well-established standard of professional responsibility that the SEC and
other regulators enforce in disciplinary proceedings.144
(3) Duty to Convey Accurate Information. When communicating
information about an investment product or strategy to an investor, the
investment advice provider must exercise reasonable care to ensure that he
conveys the necessary information to make an informed decision (including
costs and conflicts of interest), that the information is correct and that he
conveys it accurately.145 Since the foundation of the federal securities
142. See Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Cheng, 901 F.2d 1124, 1128 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (explaining broker‘s duty to act only as authorized); Pross v. Baird, Patrick & Co.,
585 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (describing unauthorized trading as
―reprehensible‖); In re Rooney A. Sahai, Exch. Act Rel. 51549, 2005 WL 883705, at *6
(Apr. 15, 2005) (stating that unauthorized trading violates NASD Conduct Rule 2110 that
requires observance of ―high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade‖); NASAA UNETHICAL BUS. PRACTICES OF INV. ADVISERS, INV. ADVISER
REPRESENTATIVES, AND FED. COVERED ADVISERS MODEL R. 102(a)(4)-1(d) (2005), available
at http://www.nasaa.org/content/Files/IAUnethical091105.pdf (stating that ―[p]lacing an
order to purchase or sell a security for the account of a client without authority to do so‖ is
an unethical business practice).
143. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d
Cir. 1998) (setting forth the history of the duty of best execution); see also NASD R. 2320
(NASD
2010),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3643 (―In
any transaction for or with a customer[,] . . . a member . . . shall use reasonable diligence to
ascertain the best market for the subject security and buy or sell in such market so that the
resultant price to the customer is as favorable as possible . . . .‖).
144. Sinclair v. SEC, 444 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming SEC‘s order barring
broker-dealer‘s order clerk because he breached duty of best execution); In re Michael L.
Smirlock, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1393, 55 SEC Docket 1529 (Nov. 29, 1993)
(finding that the Chief Investment Officer of investment adviser failed to take adequate
steps to obtain best execution for clients).
145. An agent has a duty ―to use reasonable efforts to give his principal information
which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the agent has notice, the principal
would desire to have . . . .‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958). This duty is
an aspect of FINRA‘s requirement of ―fair dealing with customers.‖ See FINRA R. 2010
(FINRA
2008),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=6905
(―A
member, in the conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor
and just and equitable principles of trade.‖); NASD R. IM-2310-2 (NASD 2010) available
at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3640
(―Implicit in all member and registered representative relationships with customers and
others is the fundamental responsibility for fair dealing.‖). With respect to an investment
adviser‘s duty to disclose material conflicts of interest, see NASAA UNETHICAL BUS.
PRACTICES OF INV. ADVISERS, INV. ADVISER REPRESENTATIVES, AND FED. COVERED
ADVISERS MODEL R. 102(a)(4)-1(k).
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regulatory system is based on complete and accurate disclosure, it is
incumbent upon the professional to live up to this standard so that the
investor has the requisite information to make an informed decision about
the investment or strategy.146
The litigation resulting from the collapse of the auction rate securities
(ARS) markets is a good illustration of the harm that can be caused by the
careless dissemination of inaccurate information. In 2008-2009, the SEC
and other regulators entered into settlements with a number of securities
firms involving charges that the firms‘ salespersons misrepresented that
ARS were safe, liquid investments that were the equivalent of cash or
money market funds.147 As a result of these misrepresentations, many retail
investors invested funds they needed to have available on a short-term basis
and lost the ability to access those funds when the credit markets froze.148
If these actions had been litigated, it is not clear that the SEC could have
established fraud. While the SEC alleged knowledge on the part of the
firms that the ARS market was deteriorating, which, if established, would
support a fraud claim,149 it also alleged that the firm did not adequately
train its salespersons to ensure that they understood the products they were
selling, which, if established, is a negligence claim. Even if the agency
could not establish that the misrepresentations constituted securities fraud,
it is likely that the agency could have established that the firms and their
salespersons made negligent misrepresentations about the nature and risks
of ARS that misled customers and caused them serious injury. This
constitutes unprofessional conduct; securities professionals owe a duty to
understand the products they are selling and to explain them accurately to
investors. Moreover, the settlements reflect the regulators‘ conviction that
the firms should pay investors for the harm caused by their negligence.
146. See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding
that a broker-dealer must disclose to a customer that it is a market maker with respect to a
given security); SEC v. Hasho, 784 F. Supp. 1059, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that a
broker-dealer made misstatements and unjustified predictions); In re Flanagan, Securities
Act Release No. 8437, Exchange Act Release No. 49979, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1447 (July 7,
2004) (broker-dealer must disclose differences between mutual fund classes); In re Alfred
C. Rizzo, 1984 SEC LEXIS 2429 (Jan. 11, 1984) (stating that investment adviser must base
recommendations on accurate research).
147. The SEC posted the settlements and other documents on its website. Auction Rate
Securities, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/investor/ars.htm (last modified July 21, 2009).
148. See Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Div. of Enforcement, SEC, Testimony
Concerning the SEC‘s Recent Actions with Respect to Auction Rate Securities (Sept. 18,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts091808lct.htm (noting that
investors ―could not access their funds for important short term needs‖ after brokers had led
them to believe their investments were ―safe and liquid‖).
149. In their complaints, the SEC alleged broker-dealer fraud under section 15(c) of the
Exchange Act. See, e.g., Auction Rate Securities, supra note 147 (listing complaints against
Bank of America, RBC Capital Markets Corp., and Deutsche Bank). Because these actions
were settled, the firms did not admit or deny the findings.
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(4) Suitability Obligation. When making recommendations about
products and strategies (or effecting purchases if it is a discretionary
account), the investment advice provider must have sufficient information
about (1) the investor‘s financial situation, including current holdings and
investment objectives, and (2) the investment product or strategy he
recommends, so that his recommendations are suitable for the customer.150
FINRA has been the regulator that has principally explicated the suitability
obligation through its interpretations of NASD Conduct Rule 2310 in
disciplinary proceedings against broker-dealers,151 but the SEC has made
clear that the suitability obligation applies as well to investment advisers
through its interpretation of section 206(4) of the Advisers Act.152 The
suitability obligation requires the investment advice provider to undertake
due diligence both as to the investor and the security. Thus, the first prong,
referred to as ―customer-specific‖ suitability, requires that the
recommendation be consistent with the investor‘s financial situation and
investment objectives and also requires due diligence on the part of the
investment adviser provider to ascertain the investor‘s needs. The second
prong, referred to as ―reasonable basis‖ suitability, requires that the
investment advice provider understand the characteristics of the
investment, including its risks and rewards.153 While the SEC views the
suitability obligation as an aspect of the investment adviser‘s fiduciary
duty, the suitability obligation is better grounded in the concept of
professionalism: a professional does not make a recommendation about a
matter that is important to the investor‘s welfare unless he has done his due
diligence.
Much of the contentious debate over the fiduciary duty standard has
focused on the suitability standard. Investment adviser groups argue that
the investment adviser‘s obligation to act in the best interests of the client is
a higher standard than the suitability standard.154 They draw a distinction
150. NASD
R.
2310
(NASD
1996),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=4315;
In
re
Arleen W. Hughes, Exchange Act Release No. 4048, 27 S.E.C. Docket 629 (Feb. 18, 1948).
151. See, e.g., In re Willard, Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2006006046401, 2009 FINRA
Discip. LEXIS 47, at *28 (Dec. 18, 2009) (suspending and fining registered representative
for unsuitable recommendations); In re Evans, Disciplinary Proceeding No.
2006005977901, 2009 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 40, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2009) (barring registered
representative from association with any FINRA firm after recommending and effecting
unsuitable transactions); In re Siegel, Complaint No. C05020055, 2007 NASD Discip.
LEXIS 20, at *36-37 (Nat‘l Adjudicatory Council May 11, 2007) (fining and suspending
registered representative for making unsuitable recommendations).
152. See Suitability of Investment Advice, supra note 41 (stating that the proposed
suitability obligation for investment advisers was a codification of existing principles).
153. In re Siegel, 2007 NASD Discip. LEXIS 20, at *36-37.
154. See Wall Street and Fiduciary Duties, Can Jail Time Serve as an Adequate
Deterrent for Willful Violations?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime & Drugs of the
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between the investment adviser‘s fiduciary obligation—that its
recommendation is in the investor‘s best interests—and the broker-dealer‘s
suitability obligation, which requires that its recommendation is suitable for
the investor.155 There is little support, either in the law or regulatory
guidance, for this distinction. Beginning with Capital Gains,156 courts have
viewed the ―best interests of the client‖ standard as an aspect of the
investment adviser‘s duty of loyalty to address conflicts of interests,157
rather than as an aspect of the adviser‘s duty of care addressing the quality
of investment advice. Over time, the SEC came to express the investment
adviser‘s fiduciary obligation more generally as a duty of loyalty that
requires advisers to manage their clients‘ portfolios in the best interest of
clients; specific aspects of that duty include disclosing conflicts and having
a reasonable basis for client recommendations.158 While the agency‘s
references to the ―best interests of the client‖ standard have blurred
distinctions between the duties of loyalty and care,159 the SEC‘s position
that the suitability obligation applies to investment advisers reinforces the
position that the ―best interests‖ standard does not establish a higher
standard related to the quality of advice, since it would not make sense to
have a redundant lower standard of care if the best interests standard is
applicable to the advice giving function.160 Consistent with this, FINRA
has frequently equated the suitability standard with acting in the best
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7 (2010) (Testimony of Barbara Roper, Director of
Investor Protection, Consumer Federation of America) (urging the expansion of fiduciary
duty to brokers and their dealings with their clients); see also Release, Financial Planning
Coalition, 75,000-Member Fin. Planning Coal. to Senate: Reduce Elder Fin. Abuse and
Protect All Consumers by Approving Fiduciary Standard Amendment (May 12, 2010),
available at http://www.financialplanningcoalition.com/docs/assets/9223C96D-1D09-67A1AC4D1C6E1984939D/RLSmediacallonAkaka-Menendez-Durbinamendmentv3final.pdf
(supporting an amendment requiring broker-dealers to act in the best interests of their
clients). The SEC‘s Investor as Purchaser Subcommittee stated that it was ―relatively
uncontroversial‖ that ―the federal fiduciary duty standard is a higher standard than the
suitability standard that applies to brokers.‖ Memorandum from the SEC Investor as
Purchaser Subcomm. to the SEC Investor Advisory Comm. 10-11 (Feb. 15, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/invadvcomm/iacmemofiduciaryduty.pdf.
155. See Memorandum from the SEC Investor as Purchaser Subcomm., supra note 154,
at 11.
156. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
157. See, e.g., SEC v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 712 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that fiduciary
duty requires disclosure of conflicts of interest); SEC v. Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867, 901
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that IAA § 206 applied to adviser‘s allocation of shares to
personal and family account to the detriment of clients).
158. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting SEC‘s Hedge
Fund Rule, Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004)).
159. See, e.g., Agency Cross Transactions for Advisory Clients, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(3)2(c) (2010) (stating that nothing in the rule relieves investment advisers from acting in the
best interests of the client, including the duty of best price and best execution).
160. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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interests of the investor.161 Finally, this supposed distinction between the
―best interests‖ and ―suitability‖ standards is based on a faulty premise—
that there is only one ―best‖ investment instead of a number of suitable
investments that would fulfill the investment advice provider‘s professional
responsibility. Given the multiplicity of investment opportunities, it is farfetched that one would be ―best.‖
Investment advisory groups are correct to criticize the common
practice of some broker-dealers in recommending proprietary mutual funds
that carry high costs without disclosing the availability of comparable
mutual funds at significantly lower costs. The investment adviser groups
suggest that this would satisfy a suitability obligation standard, but not a
―best interests‖ standard.162 To date, the importance of considering costs in
determining suitability has principally arisen in three situations:
recommending 529 plans with complex fee structures,163 recommending
Class B mutual fund shares in situations where Class A shares were less
expensive,164 and recommending switching of mutual funds.165 In these
161. See In re John Richard Willard III, Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2006006046401,
2009 FINRA Discip. LEXIS 47, at *28-29 (Dec. 18, 2009) (noting that the suitability
obligation flows from the requirement that a broker acts in the best interests of the client).
162. See, e.g., David Serchuk, Suitability: Where Brokers Fail, FORBES, June 24, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/06/23/suitability-standards-fiduciary-intelligent-investingbrokers.html (commenting that brokers will push what is suitable, but not necessarily what
is best for customers); Where Do We Go From Here, INVESTMENT NEWS, February 14,
2010,
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100214/REG/100219956
(discussing
industry understanding and application of the standards).
163. 1st Global Capital Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 54754, 2006 SEC Lexis 2632,
at 5 (Nov. 15, 2006) (settled disposition) (finding that because broker-dealer did not
adequately understand and evaluate the comparative costs of the various classes of 529 Plan
units it sold, it lacked reasonable grounds to believe that its recommendations were suitable,
based upon 529 Plan fee structures and customer needs and objectives).
164. See Raghavan Sathianathan, Exchange Act Release No. 54722, 2006 WL 3228694
(Nov. 8, 2006), aff’d 304 F. App‘x 883 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that registered
representative‘s recommendations to purchase Class B shares in seventeen mutual funds
were unsuitable because they were designed to maximize his own commissions rather than
to establish suitable portfolios); see also FINRA R. 2342 (FINRA 2009), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8414
(prohibiting ―breakpoint‖ sales for the purpose of earning the FINRA member a higher sales
charge); FINRA, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 95-80 (NASD Sept. 26, 1995), available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=1876
(explaining FINRA member obligations with respect to mutual fund sales practices because
of proliferation of new funds and varied fee structures); FINRA, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 94-16
(NASD
Mar.
1994),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=1518
(reminding FINRA members of mutual fund sales obligations, including disclosure of fees
and breakpoints).
165. See Krull v. SEC, 248 F.3d 907, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that registered
representative‘s recommendations to switch mutual funds were unsuitable because of the
high costs associated with short-term trading in mutual funds); see also NOTICE TO
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situations, regulators have established the principle that broker-dealers do
not meet their suitability obligations when recommendations are made to
maximize their own profits. While extending this principle to brokerdealers‘ recommendations of proprietary funds instead of lower-cost
alternatives is supportable as a matter of logic, it conflicts with recognition
of the fact that, in a world with a multitude of investments, broker-dealers
may select which investments they choose to offer their customers. Indeed,
the broker-dealer‘s duty to know the investment necessarily places a limit
on the number of investments it can recommend. A broker-dealer can
reasonably argue that its obligations when recommending a product cannot
extend to comparing that investment with every other comparable product.
Thus far, the regulators have principally dealt with costs and conflicts of
interest as a disclosure issue. In 2004, the SEC proposed a rule requiring
more specific customer-tailored disclosure at the time of sale.166 The
broker-dealer industry has resisted the rule, and to date it has not been
adopted.
Thus, the investment adviser community makes a good point that the
suitability obligation, as currently interpreted, provides inadequate
protection to retail investors, the principal purchasers of load funds.
Comparison of costs is an important aspect of suitability. If two
investments are identical in every way but one is more expensive, it is
difficult to find the higher cost investment suitable. Although, to date, the
SEC has done a poor job in improving mutual fund disclosure to retail
investors,167 ultimately, that may be the best solution. Dodd-Frank directs
the SEC to improve disclosures regarding the terms of the relationship and
to prohibit abusive sales practices, conflicts of interest, and compensation
schemes.168 If the broker-dealer believes that the higher-cost proprietary
investment has benefits for the customer that warrant the additional costs, it
should be able to justify them. Accordingly, the SEC‘s suitability rule
should make explicit that with respect to comparable investment products
that are available at different prices, the suitability obligation also requires
a comparison of costs.169
MEMBERS 95-80, supra note 164.
166. Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements for
Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, 69 Fed. Reg. 6438 (proposed
Feb. 10, 2004). The SEC later re-proposed the rule in Point of Sale Disclosure
Requirements and Confirmation requirements for Transactions in Mutual Funds, College
Savings Plans, and Certain Other Securities, and Amendments to the Registration Form for
Mutual Funds, 70 Fed. Reg. 10,521 (proposed Mar. 4, 2005).
167. I have previously criticized the SEC‘s performance in Barbara Black, Are Retail
Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 303 (2008).
168. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(l), 124 Stat. 1376, 2005-06 (2010).
169. Cost comparisons are important, but not decisive, in suitability analysis. See In re
Doherty, 2005 NASD Discip. Lexis 17 (Mar. 15, 2005) (rejecting enforcement‘s argument
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I also propose two additional standards applicable whenever the
investment advice provider holds itself out as looking out for the interests
of its investors or providing ongoing advice and the retail investor relies on
the investment advice provider to do so. These duties are:
(5) Duty to Warn. Investment advice providers owe a duty to warn
the retail investor when they become aware that securities or strategies the
investor decides to pursue on her own entail greater risks than she should
assume based on her financial situation. It is the responsibility of a
professional to explain the risks of an important decision to his customer or
client if, based on his expertise, he has reason to believe that the individual
does not fully appreciate them. This duty is most applicable when
unsophisticated retail investors express an interest in investing in low-cost
and speculative securities or engaging in high-risk trading strategies.
Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,170 one of the most
frequently cited opinions on broker-dealers‘ duties to their customers,
explicitly states that their professional responsibilities include a duty to
warn. Moreover, the duty is well-recognized within the securities industry;
brokerage firms‘ compliance manuals frequently state that warning
customers of risks they may not adequately understand is part of brokers‘
responsibilities to their customers.171 Margin trading is regarded as such a
risky trading strategy that the broker-dealer must furnish the customer a
specific statement of the risks involved.172 Indeed, with respect to certain
high-risk trading strategies, such as penny stocks,173 day trading,174 and
options trading,175 the SEC and the FINRA go further than a duty to warn
and require the broker-dealer to make a determination of suitability before
effecting the transaction or opening the account, irrespective of whether the
broker-dealer has made a recommendation.
(6) Duty to Monitor. All investment advice providers that represent
that they are providing advice on an ongoing basis should have a duty to
that registered representative‘s recommendations were unsuitable because the investor‘s
costs would have been lower if he had invested in Class A shares of a single fund family
rather than the Class B shares in several fund families that the registered representative
recommended, because it focused solely on cost savings).
170. 461 F. Supp. 951, 953-54 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
171. See Barbara Black and Jill I. Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and
Risk in Securities Law, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 483, 501-02 (2003) (describing a study guide and
compliance manuals that set forth broker‘s duty to warn).
172. FINRA
R.
2264
(FINRA
2009),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=11901.
173. Sales Practice Requirements for Certain Low-priced Securities, 17 C.F.R. §
240.15g-9 (2010).
174. FINRA
R.
2130
(FINRA
2010),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8831.
175. FINRA
R.
2360(b)(16)
(2010),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6306.
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monitor the investor‘s account, reassess periodically the investor‘s
investment objectives and strategy, and, when appropriate, recommend
modifications to the investor‘s portfolio. Adjustments to the investment
strategy may be warranted because of changes in investor‘s personal
circumstances (e.g., retirement), changes in specific investments (e.g.,
downgrading of credit rating) and changes in market conditions (e.g.,
extreme volatility). Although current law has not been precise in
distinguishing between these three components of monitoring, the law is
clear in treating the monitoring obligations of investment advisers and
broker-dealers very differently. Capital Gains described the investment
adviser‘s function as providing ―continuous‖ advice,176 which is a vague
description but must encompass some duty to update. The SEC previously
proposed a suitability rule for investment advisers that would have at least
required investment advisers to update customer information so that they
could adjust their advice.177 In addition, the Restatement (Second) of
Agency includes, for those whose duties include management of the
portfolio, a duty to change investments if warranted by changes in the
security or changes in the client‘s condition.178 In contrast, courts
consistently state that the broker-dealer‘s duty is transaction-specific and
do not recognize that broker-dealers have any duty to provide ongoing
advice to their customers or to monitor their customers‘ accounts and
update previous advice, except in limited situations where the broker-dealer
exercises ―control‖ over the account.179 The SEC, however, has recognized
that broker-dealers have a duty to update recommendations in at least one
situation: where a broker-dealer recommended an unseasoned company on
the basis of management projections, it had a duty to communicate
subsequent adverse information to its customers.180 Moreover, a principal
reason for the SEC‘s adoption of a rule that would have allowed brokerdealers to offer fee-based accounts without registering as investment
advisers was that it could improve the advice-giving function of broker176. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963); see also
Erlich v. First Nat‘l Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 234-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1984) (holding that the standard of care for a professional investment adviser is higher than
the broker-dealer‘s suitability obligation).
177. Suitability of Investment Advice, supra note 41, at 13,464.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 425(c) (1958).
179. See, e.g., De Kwiatowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir.
2002) (stating that it is ―uncontested‖ that a broker ordinarily has no duty to monitor the
account or provide advice on an ongoing basis); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08,
cmt. d (2006) (stating that a securities broker‘s duty of diligence is limited to executing a
client‘s orders and does not extend to advising the client or issuing risk warnings on an
ongoing basis); see also Black & Gross, supra note 171, at 487-488 (explaining the
differences in the broker‘s obligations based on the type of account).
180. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Exchange Act Release No. 14149,
[1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 88,723 (Nov. 9, 1977).
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dealers by severing the link between compensation and individual
brokerage transactions.181 Finally, the brokerage industry identifies
monitoring the customers and making ongoing recommendations as the
mark of a professional. The qualification examination for general securities
registered representatives identifies monitoring the customer‘s account and
making ongoing recommendations as one of the broker‘s ―critical functions
and tasks,‖182 and many securities firms at least periodically inquire if there
has been a change in their customers‘ personal circumstances and update
their customers‘ profiles.183
Finally, both investment advisers and broker-dealers compete head-on
for business and advertise on the basis of the quality of their investment
advice. Both hold themselves out as providing ongoing investment advice
tailored to meet the changing needs of the individual investor. This is
reflected in their titles: many broker-dealers call themselves financial
advisers or consultants, and many investment advisers consider themselves
financial planners. Because many retail investors do not perceive a
difference between the services provided by broker-dealers and investment
advisers,184 they rely on their investment advice providers‘ representations
that they are looking out for them. An SEC rule that imposed a monitoring
duty on both broker-dealers and investment advisers would be a significant
improvement in investor protection and consistent with the modern reality.
Unfortunately, however, Congress restricted the SEC‘s authority to
adopt standards of care in one significant respect. Section 913(g)(1) of
Dodd-Frank states that ―nothing in this section shall require a broker or
dealer or registered representative to have a continuing duty of care or
loyalty to the customer after providing personalized investment advice
about securities.‖185 Accordingly, the SEC cannot impose on brokerdealers a duty to monitor and cannot eliminate the most significant
distinction between the broker-dealer and the investment adviser under the
current law and a source of great confusion for retail investors. This is a
serious shortcoming that can only be cured by congressional amendment.
181. See Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. §
275.202(a)(11)-1 (2005) (exempting certain broker-dealers providing advice that is solely
incidental to brokerage services from the Advisers Act. The D.C. Circuit later struck down
the rule as contrary to the language of the Advisers Act. Fin. Planning Ass‘n. v. SEC, 482
F.3d 481, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
182. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., CONTENT OUTLINE FOR THE GENERAL SECURITIES REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVE EXAMINATION (TEST SERIES 7) 3 (1995), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@comp/@regis/documents/industry/p03820
1.pdf.
183. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a)(17)(i)(B)(3) (2010) (containing a limited
requirement to update investment objectives but only with respect to accounts for which the
broker-dealer is required to make a suitability determination).
184. THE RAND STUDY, supra note 3, at 117-18.
185. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913(g)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010).

BLACKFINALIZED_TWO

92

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

1/23/2011 1:48 PM

[Vol. 13:1

Unless that happens, the SEC should adopt a duty to monitor for
investment advisers and a rule prohibiting broker-dealers from advertising
or otherwise holding themselves out as providing ongoing advice.
Because many investors make their own investment decisions and
select their investment advice providers for reasons unrelated to the quality
of the investment advice, the investor and investment advice provider
should have the freedom to agree that the duty to warn and the duty to
monitor (with respect to investment advisers) do not apply to their
relationship. Accordingly, their contract can explicitly state that the
investment advice provider does not undertake these responsibilities.
Unfortunately, written disclaimers do not provide adequate disclosure to
investors if the broker-dealer or investment adviser, as the case may be,
makes oral representations to the contrary on which the investor relies.
Courts have consistently found investors‘ reliance on oral representations
unreasonable when they were inconsistent with the written disclaimer.186
Because the investor needs to understand that he cannot expect such
services, the disclaimer should be written in plain English with bold-face
type and require a separate acknowledgement, such as initialing, from the
investor. The investment advice provider should be required to document
that the provision was specifically called to the attention of the investor.
Finally, the investor should not be barred from presenting evidence that the
investment advice provider made other written or oral representations on
which the investor relied that contradict the written disclaimer.187
Adoption by SEC rulemaking of professional standards of care and
competence for all investment providers should advance investor protection
by providing clear and workable standards for all investment advice
providers. First and foremost, the performance of investment advice
providers should improve, because of their greater awareness of the
importance of their professional responsibilities. In addition, although the
SEC, because of resource constraints, usually limits its enforcement actions
against securities professionals to instances of egregious fraud, it should
place a high priority on disciplinary and enforcement actions for violations
of these rules in order to impress upon broker-dealers and investment

186. See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1993)
(upholding grant of summary judgment to investment fund because the unsophisticated
investors‘ reliance on oral communications was not reasonable when the prospectus
contained adequate disclosures about the risk); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511,
1518-19 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating that ―[I]t is evident that [the investor] acted recklessly by
intentionally closing his eyes to and failing to investigate the contradiction between the
misrepresentations and the information in the memorandum.‖).
187. See Geman v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that a firm
offering wrap-fee program and holding itself out as a fiduciary in its promotional brochure
should be held to a fiduciary standard).
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advisers the importance of these professional standards.188 In addition, as I
discuss in Part V, investors should have greater success in establishing
negligence claims against investment advice providers based on failure to
live up to the standards established by the SEC rules adopted for their
protection. Accordingly, as the SEC proceeds with its study mandated
under section 913 of Dodd-Frank and considers subsequent rulemaking, I
urge that it carefully consider adoption of these professional standards of
care and competence.
I next explore the issue of investors‘ remedies in Part V.
V.

INVESTORS‘ REMEDIES AND MANDATORY SECURITIES ARBITRATION

Section 921 of Dodd-Frank gives the SEC the authority to prohibit or
restrict the use of agreements that require investors to arbitrate future
disputes ―arising under the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations
thereunder, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization.‖189 In this Part, I
first explain the limited availability of investors‘ remedies for careless and
incompetent investment advice under current law. I then explore whether
federal or state courts would recognize additional remedies if the SEC
adopted the standards of care and competence proposed in Part IV. Unless
adoption of SEC standards creates additional private remedies for
investors, securities arbitration provides investors with a significant
advantage: arbitration panels allow investors to recover damages for harm
caused by negligent investment advice even in the absence of a legal cause
of action. If the SEC exercised its authority to prohibit the use of PDAAs
with respect to federal and SRO rule-based claims, the paradoxical result
may be to reduce the remedies available to retail investors, the very group
that Congress was concerned about protecting.
A.

The Unavailability of Investors’ Remedies

Although courts hold broker-dealers and investment advisers to the
standards of care and competence established under federal securities laws
and SRO rules and acknowledge their importance for investor protection in
disciplinary or enforcement actions,190 they resist investors‘ efforts to
188. This is consistent with the legislative intent expressed in Dodd-Frank section
913(h)(1) that the SEC ―[should] seek to prosecute and sanction violations of the standard of
conduct applicable to a broker or dealer providing personalized investment advice about
securities to a retail customer under this Act to the same extent as the Commission
prosecutes and sanctions violators of the standard of conduct applicable to an investment
advisor under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.‖ In fact, the SEC has not previously
placed a high priority on conduct implicating the duty of care owed by investment advisers.
189. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 921(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
190. See, e.g., Geman, 334 F.3d at 1191 (affirming SEC‘s finding that the breach of the
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recover damages for losses caused by failure to adhere to those standards,
unless the investor can establish fraud. Similarly, many courts are reluctant
to impose liability for damages based on industry standards, even though
general agency and tort principles support the use of an industry
professional standard to establish a standard of care for a negligence
claim.191 Even in instances where securities professionals hold themselves
out as possessing special skills and knowledge, courts are reluctant to hold
them to that standard, despite the fact that the Restatement (Third) of
Agency states it is appropriate to do so.192 Thus:
(1) Prohibition against Unauthorized Trading. Federal courts do
not recognize unauthorized trading as a Rule 10b-5 violation for which
investors can recover damages,193 although state courts generally allow
investors to bring unauthorized trading claims as a breach of the agency
relationship.194
(2) Duty of Best Execution. Investors cannot recover damages for a

duty of best execution by order clerk was in furtherance of fraud on the broker-dealer‘s
customers); Sinclair v. SEC, 444 F.2d 399, 400-02 (2d Cir. 1971) (affirming SEC‘s
conclusion that investment adviser‘s failure to disclose fully how it handled principal trades
harmed customers).
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (2006) (stating that an agent‘s duty to his
principal is to act with the same ―care, competence, and diligence‖ as a similarly situated
agent); Id. § 8.11 (stating that an agent has a duty to notify his principal of facts that he
knows or should know his principal would want to know); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 299A (1965) (stating that one who works in a profession is ―required to exercise
the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good
standing in similar communities,‖ unless he makes known that he is of a different skill or
knowledge).
192. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 cmt. c (stating that ―[t]he agent‘s
professed level of skill or knowledge becomes the standard against which the agent‘s
performance should be assessed‖); see also Hooker, supra note 124, at 3 (stating that the
specific duties that bind a professional are defined by the expectations that the profession
has created in the public mind). For a rare instance where the court has held the
professional to his promotional pitch, see Geman, 334 F.3d at 1189 (holding firm to a
fiduciary standard after it identified itself as an independent fiduciary in its promotional
brochure).
193. See Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 833 F.2d 909, 917 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that
investor could not succeed on his claim because broker did not act with the requisite scienter
for a Rule 10b-5 violation).
194. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 383 (1958) (stating that agent has a duty
not to act in principal‘s affairs, except with personal privilege or with the principal‘s
consent); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, 901 F.2d 1124,
1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (analyzing an unauthorized trading claim under an agency law
framework); Wildermuth v. Becker, No. 87-5368, 1989 WL 46840, at *5 (E.D. Pa. April 28,
1989) (holding that unauthorized trading constituted breach of defendants‘ duties as an
agent); Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. R.D. Kushnir & Co., 267 B.R. 819, 824 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2001) (holding that unauthorized trading constituted a breach of defendant‘s duties as an
agent).
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violation under federal law unless they can establish Rule 10b-5 fraud,195
although some state courts may allow a claim based on negligence.196
(3) Duty to Convey Accurate Information. As a result of Gustafson
v. Alloyd Co., Inc.,197 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,198 and Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,199 investors do not have a federal
damages remedy for losses caused by careless and incompetent investment
advice, with one exception: when the investment advice provider sold the
investor shares in a mutual fund.200 Even in that instance, the investor‘s
remedy is generally illusory. Consider, for example, two scenarios in
which an investor, who told her registered representative of her plans to use
her funds to buy a house within a year, purchased ARS after her broker
tells her that ARS are liquid investments. In the first, assume that the
investor can prove that the mutual fund prospectus contained a
misstatement about the investment‘s liquidity of which she was unaware.
The investor can establish a prima facie section 12(a)(2) claim, but the
broker-dealer is not liable if it can establish one of the affirmative defenses:
(1) It did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of the misstatement. So long as the broker-dealer did not
participate in the preparation of the mutual fund prospectus, it can likely
establish this ―reasonable care‖ defense.201 (2) It can prove that the
investor‘s losses were caused by something other than depreciation in value
resulting from the misstatement.202 This ―loss causation‖ defense may
effectively preclude any damages recovery,203 particularly since courts have
not recognized consequential damages based on illiquidity.204 In the second
scenario, assume that the investor can prove that the registered
195. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 269-70
(3d Cir. 1998) (holding that for plaintiffs to recover damages under a Rule 10b-5 claim
based on failure of best execution, they must establish scienter).
196. See Zannini v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 667 N.W.2d 222, 234 (Neb. 2003)
(holding that investors‘ negligence claim based on discount securities broker‘s
misrepresentations concerning its ability to place and execute trade orders during period of
expansion was not preempted). But see Gurfein v. Ameritrade, Inc., 312 F. App‘x 410, 412
(2d Cir. 2009) (holding that brokerage agreement with customer did not create a breach of
contract claim for violations of SRO regulations, including duty of best execution).
197. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
198. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
199. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
200. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
201. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2006) (containing no
requirement for due diligence investigations).
202. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b).
203. See Bullard, supra note 121, at 575 (advocating that courts adopt a more flexible
loss causation standard, replacing the current strict or strong standard).
204. See Aimis Art Corp. v. Northern Trust Sec., Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 314, 320-21
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that investor could not recover damages for inability to purchase
art because of illiquid investment).
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representative made the oral misstatement about liquidity but cannot prove
that the mutual fund prospectus contains a misstatement about liquidity. In
this instance, the investor likely cannot establish a section 12(a)(2) claim
for two reasons. (1) Courts do not hold the broker‘s oral misstatement
actionable because they construe the statutory reference to ―oral
communication‖ narrowly to include only statements ―related to a
prospectus.‖205 (2) Because the prospectus contained accurate information,
courts may hold that the investor ―knew‖ that the oral communication was
untrue.206
Moreover, ARS purchasers have been consistently unsuccessful in
securities fraud class actions. While these actions have failed for a variety
of reasons, one consistent theme is that the courts have not been persuaded
that any misrepresentations were the product of fraud, as opposed to
negligence.207
As to state law claims: while leading torts commentators state that
common law liability for negligent misrepresentations exists in commercial
relationships where the injury is pecuniary,208 many state courts have been
reluctant to impose liability.209
(4) Suitability Obligation. Investors have no claim for unsuitable

205. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 688-89 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that, because the terms ―prospectus or oral communication‖ appear together, the
latter must conform to the more restrictive former term); In re Morgan Stanley Tech. Fund
Sec. Litig., 643 F. Supp .2d 366, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (upholding the Ballay observation
that only oral communications related to a prospectus are subject to Section 12 liability).
206. While section 12(a)(2) does not require plaintiff to prove due diligence, plaintiff
bears the burden of showing excusable ignorance. See Woodward v. Wright, 266 F.2d 108,
116 (10th Cir. 1959) (noting the buyer‘s burden of proving he could not have known the
falsity of statements through the exercise of reasonable care). But see MidAmerica Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass‘n v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 886 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989)
(interpreting section 12(a)(2) to bar recovery only when the investor has actual knowledge
of the misstatement).
207. See, e.g., Zisholtz v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-1287-TWT, 2009 WL
3132907, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 24, 2009); Openwave Systems Inc. v. Fuld, No. C 08-5683
SI, 2009 WL 1622164, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2009) (dismissing fraud claims, but
allowing state law claim based on breach of duty of care).
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §552(1) (1977). See Baker v. Goldman Sachs
& Co., 656 F. Supp.2d 226, 237 (D. Mass. 2009) (stating that Massachusetts has adopted the
liability standard for negligence set forth in section 552); Maliner v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
No. 04-60237-CIV-ALTONAGA/Bandstra, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5985, at *26 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 1, 2005) (allowing plaintiff‘s negligent misrepresentation claim against a portfolio
manager).
209. Under New York law, for example, courts do not allow non-fraud based claims
because they interpret the Martin Act as precluding a private right of action for common law
claims the subject matter of which is covered by the Act. See Stephenson v. Citco Group
Ltd., 700 F.Supp.2d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that the Martin Act preempted
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims).
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recommendations under federal securities laws in the absence of fraud,210
because federal courts do not imply a private cause of action for breach of
an SRO rule.211 Although some state courts have allowed unsuitability
claims based on negligent misrepresentation,212 breach of a duty of care213
or breach of fiduciary duty,214 others have not.215
(5) Duty to Warn. Federal courts do not recognize a duty to warn in
the absence of fraud.216 Because the broker-dealer‘s duty to warn is wellestablished,217 it is hard to explain why state courts are reluctant to enforce
it in investors‘ actions for damages.218 Courts do not provide extensive
analysis; they frequently state that the internal rules are for the protection

210. See, e.g., Cohen v. Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., 713 F. Supp. 653, 660 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that customer must allege scienter to state a Rule 10b-5 claim based on
unsuitable recommendations).
211. See, e.g., Appert v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, Inc., No. 08-CV-7130, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 104594, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2009) (holding that there is no private cause of
action for violation of NASD rules); SSH Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 678 F. Supp.
1055, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that there is no private cause of action for violation of
NASD and NYSE rules).
212. E.g., Byrum v. Brand, 268 Cal. Rptr. 609, 938 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
negligent misrepresentation claim can be stated in any type of relationship between a
investor and a financial consultant); Marram v. Kobrick Offshore Fund, Ltd., Nos. 01-2815BLS1, 05-0672-BLS2, 2009 WL 1015557, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 2009) (holding
that investors can bring negligent misrepresentation claims against investment adviser).
213. E.g., Ives v. Ramsden, 174 P.3d 1231 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that although
no private cause of action existed for breach of state securities suitability rule, broker could
be liable under common law for breach of duty of care).
214. E.g., Twomney v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 726 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1968) (holding that an injured investor does not have to claim fraud when a
fiduciary relationship exists).
215. E.g., Minn. Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 183
(Minn. 1994) (holding that investor‘s unsuitability claim requires fraudulent conduct);
Szego v. Craigie, Inc., 1 Va. Cir. 210 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1980) (holding that under Virginia law,
no private cause of action for violation of NASD rules exists).
216. If the failure to warn reaches the level of recklessness, it may be regarded as
equivalent to fraud. See Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Walker, Nos. 89-55085, 89-55116, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 5472 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 1991) (recognizing distinction between reckless
conduct that is the equivalent of fraud and negligence).
217. The duty to warn is a well-established concept in law and within the securities
industry. See supra notes 170-175 and accompanying text.
218. For examples of rare exceptions, see Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Co., 810 F.2d
1042, 1046 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming trial court‘s holding that broker should have warned
customer about changing from a conservative to a speculative investment strategy because
he recommended an options expert) and Beckstrom v. Parnell, 730 So.2d 942, 952 (La. Ct.
App. 1998) (upholding trial court‘s decision imposing liability on broker for failure to warn
his elderly customer about the high costs of switching mutual funds, when he was aware of
the investor‘s diminished capacities). These opinions are discussed in Black & Gross, supra
note 171, at 500-01. See also Erlich v. First Nat‘l Bank, 505 A.2d 220, 243 (N.J. Super.
1984) (granting summary judgment against a bank and investment manager for failure to
warn plaintiff about lack of diversity in investments).
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of the firm219 and express a concern that firms with higher standards would
be exposed to greater liability.220
(6) Duty to Monitor. Federal courts do not recognize a duty to
monitor, because it is not a fraud claim.221 State courts recognize that an
investment adviser has a duty to monitor,222 but generally do not impose the
duty on a broker-dealer unless the registered representative controls the
account.223
What are the overarching policy considerations that account for this
general disinclination on the part of both federal and state courts to allow
investors to recover for the injuries caused by investment advice providers‘
carelessness and incompetence? Courts have not engaged in extensive
discussion of these issues beyond technical applications of the law. It is
likely that courts are unwilling to allow investors to recover damages in the
absence of fraud because of the suspicion that dissatisfied investors seek to
hold their investment advice providers responsible whenever they lose
money. A frequent refrain is that the securities laws are not supposed to be
an insurance policy against investors‘ losses.224 Courts worry about
―hindsight bias,‖ that factfinders will find investment advice faulty simply
because it turned out to be unsuccessful.225 They apparently fear that
219. See, e.g., J.E. Hoetzger & Co. v. Ascencio, 572 F. Supp. 814, 822 (E.D. Mich.
1983) (stating that purpose of internal rules on trading limits were to protect the firm from
customers‘ losses).
220. See, e.g., DeKwiatowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1311 (2d Cir.
2002) (stating that as a policy matter, it makes no sense to discourage adoption of higher
standards by treating them as predicates for liability).
221. Even if the investment advice provider stated that it was monitoring the account, the
court would likely dismiss that representation as puffery. See, e.g., Bogart v. Shearson
Lehman Bros., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,733 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating that certain
statements made by brokers are commonly understood by investors as hyperbole rather than
statements of misrepresentations); Newman v. Rothschild, 651 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (holding that some misrepresentations are not material).
222. See Lillard v. Stockton, 267 F. Supp.2d 1081, 1117 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (Magistrate‘s
Report and Recommendation), aff’d, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Okla. 2003) (holding that
plaintiff stated claim against investment adviser for poor investment advice based on their
ongoing relationship); Erlich, 505 A.2d at 234-235 (holding that bank offering professional
investment advisory services should be held to the standard of care for professional
investment advisers).
223. See De Kwiatowski, 306 F.3d at 1302 (stating that it is ―uncontested‖ that a broker
ordinarily has no duty to monitor the account or provide advice on an ongoing basis);
McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 767 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that the
clear weight of authority is that broker is in a fiduciary relationship when the customer gives
the broker discretion over the account).
224. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005); Minn. Employees
Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Minn. 1994) (―[A] broker is not a
guarantor or insurer against losses sustained by her customer.‖).
225. Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud by Hindsight, 98
NW. U. L. REV. 773, 780 (2004) (examining judges‘ difficulties in distinguishing between
fraud and mistake).
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applying professional standards of competence and care will encourage
meritless lawsuits and subject investment advice providers to excessive risk
of liability. However, it is more plausible that judicial recognition of
standards of care and competence in private damages actions will protect
securities professionals that have acted carefully and competently from
liability because of unprofitable investments. Investors, after all, will have
the burden to establish that their broker acted carelessly and incompetently.
Just as the business judgment rule protects corporate directors from liability
for disastrous business decisions so long as they live up to their duties of
care and loyalty, so too adherence to recognized professional standards will
protect careful and competent broker-dealers and investment advisers.
Moreover, securities and advisory firms will have additional incentives to
train and supervise their associated persons and investment adviser
representatives.
Courts may also believe that regulatory supervision over the industries
provides sufficient investor protection and hesitate to impose additional
costs. Thus, for example, New York courts have been aggressive in
asserting that the state securities law, the Martin Act, ―preempts‖ investors‘
claims unless based on fraud.226 The broker-dealer and investment advisory
industries are large and complex, and there has never been an era when
government and SRO resources were sufficient to police it adequately. At
a time when governments are running at a deficit and state governments, in
particular, are forced to operate with fewer resources, it is hard to say with
a straight face that the prosecutors and regulators can adequately protect
investors.
B.

Would Adoption of SEC Standards of Care and Competence Create
Additional Remedies for Investors?

Since the Obama administration early on identified ―increas[ing]
fairness for investors‖ as a goal,227 it is perplexing that at no point did the
administration or Congress put forth a proposal to cure the most serious
deficiency in both the Exchange Act and the Advisers Act—the lack of an
explicit negligence remedy for damages in trading transactions.228 We next
consider the possibility that federal or state courts would recognize
investors‘ negligence claims based on the breach of any professional
standards adopted by the SEC.
226. CPC Int‘l v. McKesson Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 268, 277 (N.Y. 1987); Stephenson v.
Citco Group Ltd., 700 F. Supp. 2d 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
227. U.S. DEP‘T OF TREASURY, supra note 60, at 15.
228. Senator Levin proposed an amendment known as the ―Gustafson fix,‖ but his
concern dealt with the exclusion of private placements from the coverage of section
12(a)(2). 156 CONGR. REC. S3562, S3566 (May 11, 2010).
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Federal Law. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would, under its
current approach,229 imply a cause of action for damages to allow investors
to sue for harm caused by the investment advice provider‘s failure to
adhere to any standards of care and competence promulgated by the SEC
pursuant to Section 913 of Dodd-Frank. The determinative factor is
whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action,230 and the
Court requires affirmative evidence of Congressional intent.231 Thus,
whoever is arguing for an implied remedy in the face of a statute that does
not explicitly provide one must rebut a strong presumption against
implication, because, as the Court is fond of saying, Congress knows how
to create a private cause of action when it wants to.232 The Supreme
Court‘s search for Congressional intent begins with an examination of the
statute‘s text and structure.233 In Transamerica, the Court found that
Congress intended a limited rescissionary remedy in a statement that a
contract ―shall be void;‖234 by contrast, in Alexander v. Sandoval,235 the
Court found that the express provision of one method of enforcement
suggested that Congress intended to preclude others.236 Apart from the
statutory language, the Court has considered extrinsic evidence that
Congress at the time of the statute‘s enactment assumed the availability of
a private remedy, as when it amended a statute at a time when courts had
consistently found an implied remedy.237 In Touche Ross v. Redington,238
however, the Court found no implied cause of action under the ―books and
records‖ provision, section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, and stated that ―the
mere fact that [section] 17(a) was designed to provide protection for
brokers‘ customers does not require the implication of a private damages
action on their behalf.‖239
Under the Court‘s approach, the evidence in support of a
Congressional intent to create a private remedy is weak. Since the statute
does not explicitly provide one, there must be evidence that Congress must
have assumed its existence. The best evidence that Congress must have
229. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §6.3.3 (5th ed. 2007) (describing
the Court‘s development of more restrictive approaches in creating private causes of action
since Borak).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979).
233. Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
234. Id. at 18.
235. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
236. Id. at 290.
237. Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 384 (1982) (holding that there was a private
damages remedy under CFTC Act because Congress assumed one existed when it amended
statute).
238. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
239. Id. at 578.
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assumed that investors could enforce the standards in damages actions is
(1) Congress, in Section 913, gave the SEC the authority to adopt these
standards for the express purpose of improving retail investor protection
and (2) Congress, in Section 921, gave the SEC the authority to provide
investors with an opportunity to bring their claims arising under federal
securities laws and regulations in court. Accordingly, Congress must have
assumed that investors had legal claims arising under any such standards
adopted by the SEC.
The evidence against implying Congressional intent, however, is
stronger. First, nothing in section 913 contains a reference to private
enforcement.240 The placement of the new provision in the existing
legislation does not support an inference that Congress intended to create a
new private remedy. Section 913(g) of Dodd-Frank is an amendment to
provisions in the Exchange and Advisers Acts that deal with SEC authority
to adopt regulations and orders. As such, it is more like the books and
records statute in Touche Ross than the ―rights creating‖ language in
Transamerica.
Dodd-Frank section 913(h) provides a method for
enforcing the standards through SEC enforcement. Finally, it is hard to
argue that Congress could have assumed that there would be an implied
remedy, given the Court‘s current disinclination to imply remedies, because
the Supreme Court assumes that Congress knows the law.241
State Law. Adoption of SEC standards of care and competence may
encourage greater recognition of negligence claims under state law.
Currently, a few states have relied on state or SRO standards, such as the
NASD suitability rule, in setting forth duties of care owed to investors.242
State courts may place more weight on professional standards adopted by
the SEC, the federal agency charged with the responsibility of protecting
investors, in establishing the appropriate duty of care for investment advice
providers.243 Unless that happens, however, development of standards of
care and competence (whether based on professionalism or fiduciary duty)
will not adequately protect investors, because of the absence of legal
remedies available to them.
Mandatory Securities Arbitration. As the Supreme Court advanced its
pro-arbitration policy in recent years, Congress expressed concerns about
the fairness of mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts where

240. Moreover, if it is relevant under the Supreme Court‘s approach, none of the
Congressional leaders ever stated that the statute contained a private remedy for the
standards of conduct.
241. Curran, 456 U.S. at 379.
242. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
243. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08, cmt. B (―If the statute or rule is
designed to protect persons in the principal‘s position, the trier of fact may consider the
agent‘s violation of the statute in defining and applying the standard stated in this section.‖).
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employees and consumers realistically have little choice.244 Section 921 of
Dodd-Frank reflects this concern in the specific context of securities
arbitration. It gives the SEC the authority to prohibit or restrict the use of
agreements that require investors to arbitrate future disputes ―arising under
the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the
rules of a self-regulatory organization.‖245 By its terms, the statutory
language imposes a significant limitation on the SEC‘s authority to prohibit
the use of PDAAs; its authority does not extend to future disputes arising
under state law. There is no publicly available explanation for this
limitation; perhaps Congress believed it was inadvisable to give the SEC,
the agency responsible for enforcing federal securities laws, authority with
respect to state law claims.246 If the SEC chose to exercise its authority to
ban PDAAs, it could not prevent brokerage firms and investment advisers
from continuing to use them to require arbitration of state law claims
which, because of the difficulties in proving federal claims,247 comprise
most investors‘ claims.248
Most disputes between brokerage firms and their customers are
arbitrated in the FINRA forum. The FINRA arbitration forum has been
closely studied, so we know a great deal about its operation. Because
investment advisers do not have a central arbitration forum, we have much
less information about arbitration involving investment advisers and their
clients. Accordingly, the following discussion focuses primarily on brokerdealer arbitration in the FINRA forum.
People who have studied the FINRA arbitration forum closely
(including myself)249 give it high marks on most of the recognized fairness
standards for dispute resolution; the outstanding fairness concerns relate to
the presence of an industry arbitrator on every three-person arbitration
panel and lack of reasons for the arbitration panel‘s award.250 While the
system is not perfect, FINRA, under SEC oversight, has enacted major
reforms in recent years to improve the fairness of the forum. 251 It is also
244. Gross, supra note 88, at 1175.
245. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 921, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
246. I am grateful to Jill Gross for this possible explanation. Congress could prohibit
PDAAs with respect to all claims under the Federal Arbitration Act.
247. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text (supporting author‘s assertion that
apart from purchasers of mutual funds investors have no federal remedy to compensate for
losses caused by investment advice from incompetent and careless investment advice
providers).
248. FINRA arbitration claims do not require a statement of the legal basis for claims, so
under current practice there frequently is no need to classify claims as based on federal or
state law.
249. Black, supra note 87, at 3-12.
250. Id. at 7-9.
251. See, e.g., SEC Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Securities Act Release No.
56039, 72 Fed. Reg. 39,110 (July 17, 2007) (tightening the definition of public arbitrator);
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true, however, that many investors who have filed claims with the FINRA
forum have negative perceptions about its fairness.252 Accordingly, it is
incumbent upon FINRA to continue to improve the quality of the
arbitration forum. To its credit, it continues to do so. Most recently, for
example, FINRA permits parties in a pilot program to select arbitration
panels without an industry arbitrator,253 and it filed with the SEC a
proposed rule change that would give all investors the option of a panel
consisting entirely of all public arbitrators.254 FINRA also adopted a rule
that requires an arbitration panel to give reasons for its decision if both
parties request the panel to do so.255
Whatever its imperfections, the FINRA arbitration forum presents a
great advantage from the investors‘ perspective: its emphasis on equity
allows arbitrators to fashion a remedy for investors that may not be
supported by the law.256 An SEC rule prohibiting PDAAs to the full extent
of its authority would mean that investors with federal claims (principally
Rule 10b-5 fraud claims) could litigate their claims, but it would provide no
advantage to investors with claims based on violations of any SEC
standards of care or SRO rules, since courts would dismiss those claims for
failure to state a claim. Consequently, eliminating the broker-dealer‘s right
to require arbitration in a PDAA may have a serious negative impact on
many retail investors that is not fully appreciated.257
Initially, there is reason to doubt that the SEC will exercise its
discretionary authority to limit the use of PDAAs. The SEC‘s lack of full
authority to prohibit the use of PDAAs may act as a powerful disincentive.
Prior to McMahon, brokerage firms could enforce PDAAs with respect to
SEC Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Securities Act Release No. 55158, 72 Fed.
Reg. 4574 (Jan. 31, 2007) (adopting new Code of Arbitration Procedure); SEC Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change, Securities Act Release No. 40555, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670
(Oct. 22, 1998) (adopting a Neutral List Selection System for selecting arbitrators).
252. Gross & Black, supra note 86, at 379.
253. News Release, FINRA, FINRA to Launch Pilot Program to Evaluate All-Public
Arbitration
Panels
(July
24,
2008),
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/P038958.
254. Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Panel Composition Rule, and Related Rules,
of the Code Of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes (―Customer Code‖), to Provide
Customers With the Option to Choose an All Public Arbitration Panel In All Cases, SRFINRA-2010-053
(Oct.
26,
2010),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@rulfil/documents/rulefilings/p12235
4.pdf.
255. See SEC Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Require Arbitrators To
Provide an Explained Decision, Securities Act Release No. 59358, 74 Fed. Reg. 6928 (Feb.
11, 2009).
256. Black & Gross, supra note 59, at 995.
257. There are other advantages stemming from the traditional model of arbitration as an
informal, confidential proceeding that may result in a speedier, less expensive process.
Black, supra note 87, at 4.
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state claims only; this distinction led to complicated and inefficient
litigation over the nature of claims and the bifurcation of claims that the
SEC may not wish to reintroduce.258 A sensible agency choice might be to
defer any action until such time as Congress takes up the general issue of
the use of PDAAs in all employment and consumer arbitrations.
Assuming the SEC chose to prohibit PDAAs to the full extent of its
authority, brokerage firms (and investment advisers) would have to decide
whether to require PDAAs for state claims or whether to drop a PDAA
altogether. Assuming that some firms chose to require a PDAA, investors
would make strategic choices about the characterization of their claims
depending on whether they preferred litigation or arbitration. Firms may
well evaluate their choices differently, but at least some firms could decide
simply to eliminate any PDAAs from their customers‘ agreements. 259
Here we must introduce another uncertainty. What makes securities
arbitration different from other consumer and employment arbitration is
that, under FINRA Rule 12200,260 a customer can always require the firm
to arbitrate her claim. FINRA takes the position that ―it is essential for
investor protection that FINRA maintain Code Rule 12200 if Congress or
the SEC decides to limit or prohibit mandatory arbitration.‖261
Accordingly, the investor always has the option of requiring the firm to
arbitrate her dispute, even if it is a claim that the firm would prefer to
litigate, as for example, a claim based on the violation of an SRO rule. If
brokerage firms are no longer permitted to require arbitration of all
disputes, however, we can expect that the brokerage industry would
campaign to eliminate Rule 12200 as one-sided and unfair to the
industry.262 If the industry successfully eliminated Rule 12200, then claims
based on securities laws and SEC and SRO rules would be litigated unless,
after the dispute arose, both parties agreed to arbitrate.
The obvious question then becomes: if arbitration is better for most
investors, and the industry wants arbitration, then will not most parties
258. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985) (holding that
broker-dealer could require arbitration of state law claims even if the result would be
inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums).
259. If firms make different choices, this may introduce an element of competition that
investors have not previously observed. Investors may select their brokerage firm on the
basis of the presence or absence of a PDAA.
260. FINRA
R.
12200
(FINRA
2008),
available
at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4106.
261. FINRA, Statement on Key Issues at the Securities and Exchange Commission
Investor Advisory Committee Panel on Securities Arbitration 2 (May 17, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/invadvcomm/iacmeeting051710-finra.pdf.
262. SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS ASSOCIATION (SIFMA), WHITE
PAPER ON ARBITRATION IN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 3 (Oct. 2007), available at
http://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=21334 (eliminating PDAAs would give investors
―an unfair strategic advantage‖).
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agree to it post-dispute? The answer is: not necessarily. Scholars who
have studied consumer and employment arbitration note that the incentives
to support arbitration change when the system becomes voluntary.263
Similarly, brokerage firms have cost advantages attributable to mandatory
arbitration that may be lost in a voluntary system. 264 Once a dispute has
arisen, each side will have a view about whether its claim will fare better in
court or in arbitration. As a result, the parties are unlikely to agree, postdispute, on a choice of forum. Consider, for example, a $25,000 claim for
a breach of the suitability rule. The investor is likely to want arbitration,
while the firm has strategic advantages to insist on court. It will not be
cost-efficient for the investor to litigate this claim, and there is no private
cause of action for breach of an SRO rule. Conversely, if a disabled
investor has a $5 million claim against his broker-dealer for fraudulent
misrepresentations that caused him to lose his money in a Ponzi scheme,
the investor‘s attorney will likely want to take the case to a jury, with all
the attendant publicity, while the firm would prefer arbitration of the claim.
As a result, we can expect that the number of claims going to
arbitration will decrease. There is some empirical evidence in other types
of arbitration (employment and consumer) that post-dispute arbitration
agreements are rare.265 Moreover, even if Rule 12200 remains operative so
that small investors can always arbitrate their disputes, the nature of the
FINRA arbitration would likely change if it became predominately a small
investors‘ dispute resolution forum. The incentives on the part of the firm
to support arbitration decrease if they cannot require arbitration of those
claims for which arbitration is strategically advantageous for them—the
big-ticket claims that may appeal to a jury‘s sense of outrage. In
addition, the resources devoted to maintain a fair and efficient arbitration
forum—which, on the part of FINRA, are considerable—would likely
decrease if the FINRA forum becomes a small claims dispute resolution
forum. In short, eliminating mandatory securities arbitration would likely
have unintended consequences that would not be advantageous to the
263. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 568
(2001) (discussing the difference in regard for arbitration when employers and employees
voluntarily agree to arbitrate at time of initial hiring); Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be
Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 267, 279 (2008) (stating that each party has an incentive to enter into arbitration in
the predispute phase); Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 83, 139 (1996) (comparing cases in which employee‘s consent to
arbitration is voluntary to those in which consent is coerced).
264. Estreicher, supra note 263, at 563-65.
265. See Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The Feasibility of PostDispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 314 (2003);
Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting
Arbitration Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 194 (2010).
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congressional goal of improving protection for retail investors.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article addresses two provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that are
especially important for retail investor protection. Section 913 requires the
SEC to conduct a six-month study on the effectiveness of existing
standards of care for broker-dealers and investment advisers and authorizes
the SEC to establish a fiduciary duty for brokers and dealers. Section 921
grants the SEC the authority to limit or prohibit the use of PDAAs that
would require customers of investment advice providers to arbitrate future
disputes arising under the federal securities laws and regulations or SRO
rules.
Because current legal remedies provide inadequate protection for
retail investors, I applaud increased recognition of the inadequacies of the
current system. Unfortunately, much of the debate on both these provisions
has not focused on the right issues. As I argue in this paper, the SEC
should adopt professional standards of care and competence applicable to
both broker-dealers and investment advisers that provide advice to retail
investors. Further, unless and until Congress adopts an explicit remedy for
investors harmed by careless and incompetent investment advice, the
elimination of mandatory securities arbitration of federal securities and
SRO claims may have the undesirable effect of making it harder for retail
investors to recover damages for negligent investment advice. Surely, after
the worst financial crisis since the Crash of 1929 and its aftermath,
Congress cannot intend to decrease retail investor protection!

